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ABSTRACT 
The study of this current thesis is to examine the concept of imagination 
from Sino-Western comparative perspectives. East-West comparative theorists 
and critics tend to take shen-si as the Chinese counterpart of imagination. To 
begin with, therefore, I shall devote the first half of this thesis to a survey of the 
Western tradition of imagination and the Chinese one of shen-si. 
Critics soon discover that shen-si and imagination are distant products out 
of two very different cultures, thought-patterns and creative formulae. However, 
they seem to neglect that there is some features of imagination that is universally 
shared. 
Thus the second half of this thesis starts out to look at imagination from 
its very elementary level-that of image-forming. Wittgenstein and Merleau-
Ponty's perception theories are adopted to explain the formation of images. The 
finding is: where there is perception, there is imagination. It is universally shared. 
The difference, however, lies in the ways imagination handles images: In 
the West, at least up to the Romantics, philosophers and poets in general tend to 
look at objects from a definite viewpoint, while in Classical Chinese poetry and 
we find a mobile point of view. Such difference has a lot to do with their cosmic 
outlooks, and the relation between the individual and the universe. 
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PREFACE 
To examine the concept of imagination from Sino-Western comparative 
perspectives is a task both vast and difficult. Imagination is a Western term, and 
ever since Plato, it has always been a hot topic of discussion among philosophers 
and critics. By comparison, the Chinese do not have so systematic a tradition of 
the concept (or a similar concept) of imagination in their history of philosophy 
and literature. This is partly due to the effect of the pragmatic confacianism; and 
partly due to the fact that the Chinese have no such tradition of arguing and 
generating sophisticated theories as that in the West. However, it does not mean 
that in the Chinese literary and philosophical tradition, this "free faculty of the 
mind" which corresponds to the Western imagination is completely ruled out from 
the Chinese literary and philosophical tradition. The most comprehensive 
discussion is obviously Liu Xie's shen-sL 
Im my thesis, Imagination in Sino-Westem Comparative Perspectives, I shall 
therefore devote the first half to a survey of the Western tradition of imagination 
and the Chinese shensl In Chapter One I shall survey the development of 
imagination from the ancient Greek all the way down to the Romantic period. 
After a period of negligence and contempt, imagination has finally risen to its 
zenith, enjoying a prestige and respect that it never had before. The Romantic 
poets and philosophers have awaken to the fact that they have to take beyond 
their rational faculty the source of creativity. They hope that imagination can 
become, in Coleridge's idea, an "esemplastic," or "shaping," force, which can unify 
man with nature. Ironically, the more they want to come out of themselves, the 
more they turn to their internal self. 
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In Chapter Two I shall take a look at the Chinese concept of shen，Liu 
Xie’s shen-si and its various English translations. I attempt to discuss the process 
of shen-si, and its relation to the Western imagination. My chief concern, 
however, is to define shen-si in terms of the interaction between subject and 
object, the idea of shen yu wu you _ ] ^ ( t h e subject roams with the 
object). 
When comparing Western imagination (Romantic imagination in 
particular) and Chinese shen-si, critics have to, almost inevitably, compare the 
similarities and differences between them. Yet to look for their similarities has 
become a painstaking process for the critics, and there is a tendency for them to 
focus more on the differences between Romantic imagination and Chin^st shen-su 
By so doing they are relieved to conclude that shen-si and imagination are distant 
products out of two very different cultures, thought-patterns and creative 
formulae, thus they differ in their processes of evolution and their respective 
results. No doubt the two are very different concepts, but that does not 
necessarily means that the so-called Western concept of imagination can never be 
found in Chinese literature and philosophy. 
In the second half of my thesis, I shall leave the abstract theories of 
imagination and shen-si and proceed to look at imagination from its very 
elementary level-that of image and perception. This is a more fruitful approach 
to deal with imagination in Sino-Western perspectives, since there are Western 
philosophers like Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty who have given thorough 
discussions on perception and the formation of images. Although there is no very 
thorough analysis of how images are formed in China as in the West, the Chinese 
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are famous for their extensive use of images in their poetry, and in fact in their 
artistic presentations. I shall therefore, in Chapter Three of this thesis, examine 
the working of imagination in the formation of images, and even in our very 
perception of objects. My proposition is: there is always the involvement of 
imagination in the formation of images in both China and the West. To put it in 
a simple way, where there is perception, there is imagination, and their connexion 
is through the image itself. 
The difference, however, lies in the ways imagination handles images. Let me 
put it this way: As exemplified by Wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" image and 
Wordsworth's poetry, the Westerners tend to look at objects from a static 
viewpoint. Imagination in the West thus strives to complete the images on their 
own terms; whilst the Chinese tend to juxtapose various viewpoints in their art 
and poetry, and imagination serves to lead the viewer to move around an object, 
or in and out of a scence. Such difference in the roles of imagination in China 
and the West has a lot to do with their cosmic outlooks, and the relation between 
the individual and the universal. I shall examine the reasons for this difference 
in the concluding chapter. 
I shall adopt certain rules and systems in writing this thesis, for the sake 
of clarity and consistency. I would like to devote some space here specifying them 
to the readers so that unnecessary confusions can be eliminated. 
1. I shall quote from Wordsworth's The Prelude，since there are three versions of 
The Prelude, so for the sake of clarity I cite them by year, book and line numbers 
from The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850. 
2. All other poems beside The Prelude are cited by their title and line number, 
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from William Wordsworth edited by Stephen Gill. 
3. For full information of books and articles mentioned in the footnotes, please 
see the Work Cited Section. 
4. I shall use the pin-yin system for all Chinese names and terms in my thesis. 
Many writers, however, have adopted systems other than thepin-yin. For the sake 
of clarity and consistency, I shall convert them bact to pin-yin in my thesis. For 
example, Liu Hsieh will become Liu Xie, and hsu-ching will become xu-jing. As 
for the translators/critics whom, and books/articles which I borrow ideas from, 
I shall quote their names as published, regardless of which system of translation 
they have used. I do this as a sort of respect for the author, and also for readers 
to locate the sources easily. I shall, in the Work Cited section, put the pin-yin 
version of their names in square brackets where I think necessary. 
Finally, I deliberately use the term "Sino-Western" in the title of my thesis. 
I hope that does not irritate the readers since in the first half of this thesis I am 
going to trace the development of imagination in the West from the Medievals 
to the Romantics, and that involves philosophers from various countries in the 
West, such as Greece, Britain, America and Germany, etc. In the second half I 
rely a lot on some German philosophers/theorists to discuss English poetry. So 





THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMAGINATION FROM THE MEDIEVALS TO 
THE ROMANTICS 
The word "imagination" is derived from Latin "imaginatio" which has the same 
meaning as "phantasia." In fact, for quite a long time the two words have been 
regarded as synonyms, denoting in its simplest sense, the image-forming or 
image-receiving process. In what follows, I would like to give a brief overview of 
the development of imagination fromthe Medievals to the Renaissance. Since this 
is only an introductory paragraph, and my chief point of discussion here in this 
chapter is on Romantic imagination, so for the sake of convenience I would base 
my discussion on Preminger's account of imagination in his encyclopedia. I plead 
for the reader's tolerance if there is any thing they disagree or find too simple. 
The concept of imagination in the Classical and Medieval Age began with 
the "recognition of a mental image accompanying sense perception" (Preminger 
370). The Medieval Age also realised that images could occur in the absence of 
any object and combine in many ways to form other images. 
There are certain ideas and attitudes that mark this age. They include 
restraint, dominance of reason, sense of form, clarity, simplicity, logical structure 
organization and intellectualism, just to name a few. These attitudes are 
themselves self-explanatory of why imagination at that time was not in any sense 
a favorable word, especially to many rational philosophers. Plato who rejects 
poetry and art also despises imagination. To him, images are illusory, they are 
mere opinions and appearance, and therefore have nothing to do with knowledge 
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and reality. While the neo-Platonic Plotinus distrusts imagination, his predecessor 
Horace simply ignores it. The one who shows a little sympathy and concern for 
imagination is Aristotle who affirms the part played by imagination in deriving 
knowledge from experience, and sees images as the bridge between sense and 
thought, the scaffolding from which "reason abstracts its idea" (Preminger 370). 
The other sympathetic one is Longinus who values imagination as a source of 
sublimity crucial to poetry and eloquence. Yet in general, the whole Platonic and 
neo-Platonic tradition shows no trust and respect for imagination at all. 
Individuality in the Medieval Age played only a subordinate role. At that 
time, the individuals' relation to the world was still at a stage of accepting the 
earthly life, while preparing their soul for a future life. 
The Renaissance philosophers feel the immediate need to break with their 
Medieval predecessors. The Hellenistic spirit^ reminds men that they are 
glorious creatures, who have the ability to develop toward individual perfection. 
That is a world that they should enjoy, explore into, and not to adapt or evade in 
any way. Accompanying this worldly individualism are other forces unique in the 
Renaissance: the development in economy, the change in politics, the 
opportunities offered by commercialism, etc. The whole atmosphere is one of 
Humanism, paving a way for individualism to come in the 18th century. Then 
there is the discovery of the Continent of America, the breakthrough in astronomy 
by scientists like Gelileo, and also other branches of "new science" which explain 
1 The Hellenistic spirit is the Greek spirit which subordinates everything to the 
intellectual, and manifests itself in the celebration of beauty. 
, c 
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and define man and nature by scientific laws rather than by some mystic powers. 
This is again a very rational age when imagination is slighted as opposing reason. 
It is considered merely as a means by which poetical and religious conception can 
be attained and appreciated. Bacon claims that imagination plays a major role 
in poetry and cites it as one of the three faculties of the rational soul, as he 
writes, "History is to his memory; poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his 
reason" (Bacon 67). Bacon allows a wider range of freedom for imagination, that 
it "may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which 
nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things" (Bacon 
180). Bacon has a very high regard for imagination but still in a science-dominant 
and worldly-human age like the Renaissance, imagination is never encouraged to 
grow, to prosper. 
The Neo-classical age has inherited, from the Renaissance, the already 
strong interest in scientific research and philosophical thought, while on the other 
hand it adopts the classical ideal of common sense, reasons more important than 
emotion and imagination. At that time Deism was advancing to react against 
religious mysticism, and it also had an effect on literature, demanding art to 
observe the ideal of order, logic, correctness, restrained emotion and decorum. 
So in return we have poetry that is realistic, satirical, witty and didactic. Man is 
moulded into a social being, and the focus is the play of the mind upon life rather 
than the play of feeling. 
If poetry in the Renaissance is imagination of soul, in the Neo-classical time 
poetry is definitely the imagination of external nature. This has much to do with 
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the early philosophical basis in empiricism, which regards poetry as the imitation 
of empirical reality, with imagination playing a secondary role: in reaction to 
rationalism, empiricism grounds all knowledge to sense experience, so there are, 
after all, more reason and initiation to believe in imagination in an age when 
literature plays a social role. In fact, among some neo-classical writers, "reason" 
and "nature" are related in meaning, since both imply order. John Dennis defines 
nature as the visible order, and reason as an invisible one. This visible order 
supplies a whole bunch of imaginative substances for literature. So, images, 
especially visual ones, are called up, and are related to the process by which 
"imitation of Nature" takes place. Addison says in his "On the Pleasure of the 
Imagination" that sense of sight furnishes the imagination with ideas (288). He 
distinguishes between two processes of imagination, the first is the simple 
reproduction of images, the second is the rearranging and merging of those 
images into different combinations of pictures and visions. But this compounding 
of images is not without limit-its going astray can result in mere ghosts, fairies, 
witches and so on. 
Addison's affirmation of the importance of imagination has much influence 
on 18th-century criticism and on followers like Edward Young who admires those 
genius that can reign over "its own empire of chimeras."^ Another one is 
Reynolds who appeals to imagination rather than "ideal form" in creating poetry. 
Young believes that in the realm of fancy, genius (imagination) can wander freely. 
Besides, genius is also the only source of everything original. For detail please see 
Young's "Conjectures on Original Composition." 
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The spirit of the neo-classical age as reflected in literature and philosophy is 
still rational, orderly and didactical, yet there is an undercurrent of imagination 
which is gradually gaining a position, and this leads to an expansion of values and 
concepts related, like originality, individuality, ethics and poetic powers, just to 
name a few. The growth of imagination is not without reason. For quite a long 
time, the concept of "The Great Chain of Being”] has been most dominant. Here 
is an age when human reason are more superior to human imagination, the 
"Enlightenment" when science and technology are most focal. However, the 
over-emphasis on their values results in an "abstract and mechanical formalism" 
(Engell 3-4). Feeling sick of just natural laws and universal reasons, philosophers, 
critics and poets turn to imagination. However, the Great Chain of Being and 
imagination are not absolutely hostile to each other; rather, imagination emerges 
to support a fuller-view of the relation between man and nature. However, it is 
not until the movement of Romanticism that imagination celebrates its supreme 
glory in philosophy and in the Romantic Age plays an extremely crucial part in 
literature, especially poetry. 
COLERIDGE AND WORDSWORTH-TRADITIONAL VIEWS 
The Romantic movement, which began in the 18th and flourished in the 19th 
century, is a dynamic reaction against the Neo-classical type of literature, 
3 The "Great Chain of Being" is a belief that the created universe is one hierarchical 
system, and everything on earth becomes a part of this system. The lowest level in this 
system is inanimate matter, and an upward extension to lifeless things that do not reason. 
A still higher level is the rational human beings, and then angels, and finally God. 
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philosophy, art, religion and politics. There are some general terms that can 
document the age, for instance sense and feeling, nostalgia, individualism, love of 
nature, of the exotic, the grotesque and the primitive. The list can go on without 
end. However, in philosophical terms, Romanticism does have a relatively 
definite meaning. To put it in a rather simple way, it is the predominance of 
imagination over reason and formal rules. The Romantic imagination points to 
a literary and philosophical theory which places the individual in the centre of life 
with imagination as the vortex, the centre of the centre, around which philosophy, 
literature and all other things in life rotate. Art and literature were at that time 
means by which the individual, through the synthesizing power of imagination, 
could express his or her distinctive feelings and ideas. 
The two camps of leaders in dealing with imagination in the Romantic age 
are the Germans and the English: the German philosophers define imagination 
through their complex theories, while the English poets exemplify their concepts 
of imagination through their poetry. Indeed, the English Romantic Age proves 
itself to be a golden era for imagination-poetic imagination in particular. The 
period witnesses the rise of a lot of great poets: Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
Shelley, Keats and many others. They worshipped imagination and almost all of 
them have the same Romantic belief: imagination has the power to bridge the 
gulf between man and nature-not only to bridge, but to strike a balance and 
establish a final unity between, say, the transcendental and the empirical, the 
subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real, etc. By synthesizing body and 
soul, imagination can thus further join man's spirit and affection with concrete 
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nature by creating between them a sense of commonness. Of course to say that 
imagination is a unifying force and followed by giving a list of respective 
polarities, is simplifying the whole story. Yet to discuss how every single sees and 
makes use of imagination is definitely unrealistic, and it also deviates from what 
I intend to do. To make my discussion comprehensive and at the same time 
uncomplicated, I have chosen to discuss two great English Romantics: Coleridge, 
who defines, and Wordsworth, who exemplifies, imagination. 
In forming his own concept of imagination, Coleridge has drawn on almost 
everyone who has touched on the subject (Engell 328). Ever since Descartes’ 
theory of the cognitio, there has been an increasing concern about the relation 
between subject and object, between the individual self and nature. There are 
roughly two camps of theorists, one consists of the empiricists (as represented by 
Hobbes, Locke and Hartley) who believe "in the effect of nature on an 
impressible mind, through the "law of association" (Biographia 1:82), they 
represent the dogmatic, the objective, the material, the es gibt; the other camp 
consists of philosophers like Fichte and Berkeley who emphasize the dynamic and 
spiritual qualities of the self, the Ich bin!^ 
Coleridge was one of the English writers whose identity was most complex: 
he was a poet, a philosopher and a critic. As one of the leaders of the "Romantic 
revolt" in poetry, Coleridge upholds the status of poetry as the basis for man and 
4 The German es gibt means ’there is.， Here in our context it implies that the self 
is in a passive position upon the impression by things already exist; while ich bin means 
’I am,，and in here implies the very active force of the individual self. 
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his life. He also believes in our heart to feel, in the spiritual power in our 
imagination to comprehend, to recognise, through the images of beauty, the 
completeness and greatness of God's creation. 
We can classify the evolution of Coleridge's imagination as having gone 
through three stages.^ The first stage is his early encounter with associationism 
as a young man. To the young Coleridge associationism^ had its merit in the 
vividness to represent phenomena, which, however, failed to account for a theory 
of perception and the impressions formed in our mind. Coleridge was unhappy 
with the fact that there were so much he could not explain, say for instance, how 
it happened when God blew into man's nostrils, then "man became a living souL"? 
He felt the inevitability of going from outward to inward, so in his late twenties, 
he left the objective and materialist system and turned to Kant, Schelling and 
Fichte who believed in the greatness of the mind, and the self as an end. 
Coleridge then found, in the system which emphasized subjectivity, being and 
spirit as prior to matter and nature, and that the world, the nature was in fact a 
process of becoming, its origin being "Spirit" itself. Even for all that, he still felt 
5 See James EngelFs discussion on Coleridge in his The Creative Imagination, 331-334. 
6 The shared connection between an object and ideas. Coleridge spoke of it in 
Biographia: "Ideas by having been together acquire a power of recalling each other; or 
every partial representation awakes the total representation of which it had been a part." 
In other words, any sensory perception or idea may be associated with something 
from the past. 
7 God used soil to make man, as He finished, He blew into man's nostrils, and life 
flew into man. This event recorded in the Bible bothers Coleridge, as he is unable to 
explain and comprehend such a phenomenon objectively and logically with human 
knowledge. 
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the need to represent the spirit through the concrete, the phenomena. This was 
also the ideal that Coleridge had been longing for, when "the two poles thus 
fused, spirit informs matter and produces a dynamic sythesis of both systems." 
The third stage was an attempt to merge all outward experience with man"s 
inner intelligence, "the mind lives in the world, as the world exists in and for the 
mind" (Engell 333), and so arriving at a state of truthful understanding. The 
concept of understanding is the reception of objective sense plus reflection and 
subjective judgement. These two elements are in fact separate entities on 
opposite poles, how can they be joined together in one harmonious flow? 
Coleridge assumes that "visible nature per se is essentially meaningless unless it 
is recaptured in the mind through the working of imagination" (Biographia 1:304). 
The introduction of dynamic imagination has thus become a final solution to the 
problem of inadequacy in both camps. Indeed, imagination is the organic, 
unifying power of the inner faculties which can participate alone in the process 
of sythesizing separate and opposite aspects within and without, abolishing the 
barrier between the two camps, creating a unity that has no distinction between 
the subjective and objective facets in the mind. They interpenetrate each other, 
creating commonness in language of communication. 
How can imagination make the two poles penetrate each other? Coleridge's 
theory distinguishes between two levels of imagination, namely Primary 
Imagination and Secondary Imagination. Primary Imagination is the power to 
perceive and to leam about what nature is and to understand further objective 
phenomena and sense experiences. Imagination then employs associable symbols 
» 
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to convey this knowledge. Primary imagination, unlike fancy and mechanical 
memory, is very like a reflex-action which responds directly to images of external 
objects through the mind, and those images automatically fuse with our inner 
feeling and sensations to form concepts and perceptions of nature. 
Secondary Imagination is an extension of Primary Imagination. It breaks 
down what have been perceived, and the mind recreates of its own will and power 
these perceptions into other forms and concepts not directly found in the 
objective world. The two imaginations differ only in their "degree" and "mode of 
operation," 
The imagination then I consider either as Primary, or Secondary. 
The Primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime 
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The 
Secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the 
conscious will, yet still as identical with the Primary in the kind of 
its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its 
operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or 
where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it 
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all 
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (1:304) 
To put it in a simplier way, Primary Imagination first forms in the mind the 
various images of nature, while Secondary "dissolves, “ alters and reforms these 
images, finally joining the world of the self and that of nature. It is mainly 
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responsible for art creation, especially poetry. 
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 
Another great advocate of Romantic Imagination is Wordsworth. His Lyrical 
Ballads marks the offical beginning of the Romantic Period in England, when 
around that time, imagination become the central theme of poetry. Like all other 
Romantic philosophers and critics, Wordsworth also has his own idea of 
imagination which is, according to Engell, "an excited power of association 
involving ideas and emotions, stirred and compounded by memory with an energy 
that could result in an intense contemplation of the endless or the infinite" (265). 
Although Wordsworth rejects a complete differentiation of imagination and 
fancy and Coleridge criticizes him for running the risk of falling into empirical 
associationism, which can reduce the mind into being merely a "mechanical" 
receptor of outward images, they agree that imagination manifests itself in the 
unity of the whole, as Wordsworth says, "it draws all things to one and makes 
them take one colour and serve one effect" (Preminger 275). It has the power to 
perceive nature, and to unite our feeling, religious faith, sympathy with the 
existing phenomena and experience. 
If Coleridge's criterion for imagination is philosophic, Wordsworth's is largely 
experiential. It all began with the cold winter of 1798, when Wordsworth and his 
sister Dorothy were trapped in Germany, with no books and friends. Wordsworth 
then fell back on his inner resources. He fed his imagination with recollections 
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of England until he was seized by emotions similar to those he had years before 
when those experiences did happen. These new emotional experiences grew, and 
finally induced him to write poetry. Later on in the Lyrical Ballads he described 
this kind of poetry as "the spontaneous overflow of feeling." After that, poetry 
became his means to quest for imagination. "The Prelude," for instance, is looked 
upon as the evolution process, the Bildungsroman of imagination, by critics of later 
ages. The poem begins with an account of the poefs childhood in the English 
Lake Country, when he addresses nature, and experiences the world, and how its 
power, wisdom and penetrating spirit affects his childhood. He recalls his 
experience in childhood when he found a boat in a cave and rowed it out into the 
lake, 
I dipped my oars into the silent lake, 
And, as I rose upon the stroke, my boat 
Went heaving through the water like a swan; 
When, from behind that craggy steef till then 
The horizon's bound, a huge peak, black and huge, 
As if with voluntary power instinct 
Upreared its head. I struck and struck again, 
And growing still in stature the grim shape 
Towered up between me and the stars, and still, 
For so it seemed, with purpose of its own 
And measured motion like a living thing, 
Strode after me. (1850 1:374-385) 
香港中文大學圖書你藏書I 
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The perceptions of the powerful mountains has formed images in the mind 
of the child and thus risen to a sense of horrible beauty in him. This stage is very 
much that of perceptive imagination, when the child is surprised into perception, 
forming from isolated impressions a whole picture of the world. Wordsworth has 
awaken to the greatness and vastness of nature which scares him, yet he also 
enjoys freedom in his strolling through the woods and paths. This feeling of 
freedom he keeps to himself as a matter of the spirit. It is also this free flow of 
thoughts and feelings into objective phenomena which leads Wordsworth into the 
secondary stage in the quest, from nature to man himself. There is the 
recognition of a spirit underneath man and nature-imagination is supposed to 
have the power to humanize nature, so that human essence is manifested through 
nature. 
The third stage of the Bildungsroman is a redeemed nature according to 
Wordsworth and many of his followers, with imagination as supreme guide to 
freedom and morality in nature which Wordsworth looks upon as, 
The anchor of my purest thought, the muse, 
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and 
Soul of all my moral being. ("Tintern Abbey" 110-112). 
This is a process of give and take, with nature as both benefactor and receiver. 
As imagination perceives, interprets and creates nature, nature also conducts the 
force of imagination, guiding his imaginative self to perceive, to sympathise, and 
finally to identify with nature in both form and feeling. To put it in another way: 
it is the object operating upon the mind, and vice versa. 
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GERMAN ROMANTICISM-QUEST FOR THE INNER SELF 
The English Romantic imagination discussed above is a very traditional view 
and belief of the Romantic Bildungsroman of imagination. The process of the 
discovery of nature, the realization of the self through confrontation with nature, 
and a final redemption with the power of imagination mediating between man 
and nature, is the holy faith of many poets, critics and even philosophers in the 
Romantic Age and those that come after who are conservative or religious. 
Though it may sound a bit radical, the idea of a final redemption of man and 
nature through imagination is, so to speak, very much a Utopia resembling the 
classless society dreamed by the communists, which has never been quite 
achievable. Moreover, to think that this unity has already been achieved is simply 
a beautiful misunderstanding, since, if there is something called organic unity in 
the Romantic Age, it is definitely not "a naturalistic urge to identify mind with 
nature" (Kipperman 224), as many critics put it, at least not in the Romantic 
Quest when the idea of subjectivity is dominant, when the mind is so obsessed 
with its own ego that there leaves no room for uniting with nature, because the 
self is too selfish. 
The aggrendization of the ego in the English Romantic Age has its root in the 
German Romantic movement, started by Kant, Fichte and Schelling's philosophy. 
The English Romantics, especially Coleridge, are very much influenced by them, 
by their ways of looking at subjectivity and their concept of transcendental 
imagination. So, before going on to the internalised quest for the ego in the 
English Romantic poets, some discussion of a few leading German philosophers 
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on imagination and subjectivity would be very helpful to my discussion. 
Modem philosophers breaks with their predecessors in their conceptual change 
in the idea of imagination. There is a tendancy to believe that imagination is not 
divinely-inspired, rather it is the immediate source of its own truth. They try to 
demonstrate that imagination is not the reproduction of some given reality but 
production orginated from our human consciousness; that images are dynamic 
creative acts and not merely images statically stored in our memory; and finally, 
images are not mediators between lower body and higher soul but they constitute 
a transcendental unity (Kearney 156). 
Kant lived at a time when traditional perspectives were still very much 
onto-theological. They believe in divine-inspired wisdom, being as the centre of 
all human knowledge, with the mind on the side, and finally, imagination as 
mediating the soul and the body. Kant sees the need to revolt against all these. 
He declares imagination the source of knowledge, art and even existence, and he 
places the mind in a central position in reaction to the peripheral one in the past. 
From then on being is no longer central, but simply a projection of our mind, our 
subjectivity. 
Kant's response to the idea of imagination is, in some sense, the product of 
Cartesianism. Descartes，famous motto "I think therefore I am" marks the 
beginning of the Subjective Quest, when he attributes the source of meaning to 
the subject "I think" rather than to the objective world around us, or to the 
divinity. The human mind is regarded as prior to objective being, and man 
becomes the owner and master of nature. However, it is Kant who has 
23 
announced the subject as above all other beings. In his Critique of Pure Reason， 
he decides that transcendental imagination is the hidden root of all knowledge, 
and that "transcendental imagination is that which grounds the objectivity of the 
object in the subjectivity of the subject - rather than in some "transcendent" order 
beyond man" (Kearney 168). For Plato the transcendental realm is the Divine, 
whereas for Kant it is the human mind. No doubt Descartes，philosophy has 
paved the way for Kant to establish the fundamental role of subjectivity, yet it is 
definitely Kant himself who has laid the stone for the supreme role of human 
subjectivity. From then on, imagination ceases to be a mirror which reflects 
objective reality, but a lamp illuminating nature in its own way. As the root of 
sensation and intellect, imagination serves to synthesize the many and varied 
experiences produced by them. Before going into Kant's subjectivity, perhaps we 
need to know something about his concept of the Aesthetic and the Sublime. A 
major part of The Critique of Judgement is devoted to the discussion of aesthetic 
judgement, and its relation to creative imagination, to freedom. When we feel 
that something is beautiful, we are already forming some sort of aesthetic 
judgement. To form such a judgement, we have to view the object as an aesthetic 
object which is ontological and free from all external relations, rules and 
experiences. It is what Kearney regards as "inner finality of form" (169); "inner" 
because it is free from outer limitations, and within itself imagination is free to 
work on its own without responding to rules in the objective real world; "final" 
because art is its own end and not a function of the outside world. We form 
judgements on the aesthetic object according to the rules and order of our 
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imagination, and the object's own pattern, its completeness in itself. This 
experience is Kant's "free play of imagination." Each aesthetic experience is 
unique yet universal, because aesthetic pleasure is a very subjective experience, 
but since we all possess the power of creative imagination, so as long as we 
perceive the "inner finality" of a work of art, we share that aesthetic pleasure. Da 
Vinci's portrayal of Mona Lisa certainly pleased Van Den Berg-her mystic and 
suggestive "smile, ” and the landscape itself which is self-sufficient and estranged 
(62)，can arouse in us a certain aesthetic pleasure, if we can only see them as an 
autonomous aesthetic object, and at the same time allow the free play of 
imagination in us to work on its own. 
If the encounter with beauty signifies the freedom of the self and the 
harmonious interacting between imagination and understanding(something we can 
feel though we cannot conceptualise), then the encounter with the Sublime, 
signifies the limitation of the Self, or rather, the limitation of our representational 
power. Kant writes, "The feeling of the Sublime may appear in point of form to 
contravene the ends of our faculty of presentation, and to be, as it were, as 
outrage on imagination" {Judgement 245). Imagination, when dealing with beauty, 
is free to produce images without limit, and thus creating pleasure that is 
harmonious; however, when confronting the sublime, imagination panics because 
it feels something in itself that can't be represented by the images it creates, that 
after all, there is a certain region within us that is not explainable, representable, 
presentable and even apprehendable. The kind of pleasure aroused, unlike that 
in beauty which is harmonious, gives a sense of horror. This sense of horror is 
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evoked because the Sublime excited in us creates certain "ideas which cannot be 
restricted or brought down to size by any image-making power of the imagination" 
(Waraock 41)，horrible because we discover in us the depth of imagination which 
cannot be represented by its own creation. Imagination, like Mona Lisa, "holds 
that which is known, and she hides it. After this, that which is known will be 
within her, at once known and unknown" (Van Den Berg 60). This known and 
unknown reflects imagination as powerful and at the same time powerless, more 
important still, the Sublime serves to deepen and extend our sense of subjective 
interiority, it points to the very vastness of the mind that is waiting for followers 
to explore. 
Kant is no doubt the father of transcendentalism, and his theory has paved the 
way for the Romantic movement in Germany, but Fichte and Schelling who came 
after him actually ignites the fire of the Romantic Quest for the Self, with their 
affirmation of the absolute position of imagination and subjectivity. Fichte 
creates a system of imagination to explain and justify man's finitude. While most 
critics agree with the Romantic Quest as striving for an organic unity, many of 
them tend to interprete this unity as a process of bringing the mind to identify 
with nature. But Fichte had a different idea about unity: to him it is "in fact the 
creation of the mind formulating to itself its unity through a series of 
confrontations with division and finitude" (Kipperman 224). 
The interdetermination {Wechselbestimmung) of I and the Not-I® assumes 
8 According to Fichte, the T posits and thus determines itself, but since the T is 
limited, so I can only posit itself in parts, the other parts that can't be posited by the T 
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"that I exist only so far as the world I create does, and the world exists only so far 
as I permit it to."^ This assumption immediately reveals man's finitude and 
infinitude. According to Fichte, the imagination creates a world for the I to 
overcome. This is the process through which the I can assert its infinitude. This 
"striving" (as called by Fichte) to infinitude within time and finitude is actually the 
principle of the Romantic Quest, a process which is pains-taking and lonely, since 
for the self to assert its infinitude is an endless process, yet through struggling 
with the finite I am, to overcome the world it creates, man comes to gradual 
self-consciousness, and is aware of his own freedom—similar to Kanfs idea, man 
is free within his own boundary (Fichte 140-1). 
Schelling claims imagination to be "the organon and pinnacle of all 
philosophy" (Kearney 178). It is regarded as a force that serves to reconcile many 
of the oppositions in Western Metaphysics. It seems that there is nothing 
imagination cannot solve, even the contrast between man and Divine. Schelling 
describes the creativity of imagination in art and poetry as a conscious creativity. 
By so defining it, Schelling is actually telling us that imagination creates both 
nature and art. However, the most drastic and striking claim is the identifying of 
the human imagination with the Divine mentality. Schelling has thus elevated 
imagination to a divine state to be all powerful, that it is over and above reason, 
itself is the，Not I,，and in that sense the，Not-I，also determines the，I.， 
9 Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre {Science of Knowledge) edited and translated by Peter 
Heath and John Lach (New York: Appleton, 1970). The line is quoted by Kipperman 
in his article. Full information of which see Works Cited. Kipperman has made a slight 
change by translation Fichte's /c/i as T’ rather than Heath and Lach，s "self." 
‘ 
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nature, world and even God. 
This German idealist tradition is the background for the English Romantics 
when they start out on their Quest. However, the Germans are not the only ones 
who see the inner self as important. Other people in various ages have gradually 
awaken to the subject as important, too. Van Den Berg reminds us of St. 
Augustine's speaking rather of himself than of God; Rousseau's personal goal of 
presenting himself in his own way before God when the last judgement comes; 
Luther's trust of the inner soul where faith lies; and finally Da Vinci's Mona Lisa 
whose smile hides her inner self that is her own. 
THE QUEST FOR THE INNER SELF IN THE ENGLISH ROMANTICS --
COLERIDGE AND WORDSWORTH 
Coleridge is a loyal disciple of the German idealists. He believes in the 
"feeling heart," and in the spiritual power of the individual imagination. He is 
the first of the English idealist to assert the primacy of the inner vision in the face 
of the 18th-century materialism and machanical sense-bound perceptions. He 
derives from Kant and Schelling many of their ideas of reason and imaginative 
vision, both of which qualities free man from bondage. To Coleridge, visible 
nature is basically meaningless unless it is captured and reemerges again in the 
mind through the magic power of our imagination. What Coleridge means is that 
to know nature we have to know the idea hidden behind it, and this is achievable 
because the idea is already in us, the subject, the "I AM." This attitude has much 
to do with his Romantic idealist concepts that "all the sources of creative power" 
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actually reside "in our mind's internal heaven" (Frye 350). But the most 
important point is that it reflects Coleridge's view that the human mind can be 
elevated to a degree of an almost God-like state through imagination. And in 
fact, in his letter to a friend, Coleridge even suggested imagination as "a dim 
Analoque of [God's] Creation" (Collected Letters 11:1034). Coleridge starts out 
with his Romantic Quest of the Self, and his "Ancient Mariner" is actually the 
story of the soul's awakening to imagination, through separation and alienation, 
toward self-consciousness. This is the most crucial process in the Romantic 
Quest, as suggested by Hartman ("Romanticism" 53). Coleridge feels the power 
of imagination and the inevitability of going in search of the self. So almost at 
the end of his Biographia, he says that "know thyself: and shalt thou know God, 
as far as it permitted to a creature, and in God all things," but when he feels the 
energy of imagination as so immense to approximate to that of God, he changes 
what he has said and then concludes, "Ignore thyself, and strive to know thy God!" 
He decides to give up the Promethean Quest^ ® because in view of the possibility 
of his faith in God being threatened, he is totally unprepared and he is scared. 
As remarked by Bloom, Coleridge's "Prometheanism early defeated not so much 
by his selfhood as by his . . . fear of his own imaginative energy" ("Internalization" 
19). His more moderate theory of the dynamic imagination as a uniting force 
10 Prometheus is a character in Greek methology, adopted by Shelley in his lyric 
drama. Prometheus was the benefactor of mankind, he was bound to a rocky cliff by 
order of Jupiter, who was jealous of the Titan's power. Although Prometheus suffered 
tortures, he remained unconquered and no power could rule over his soul. The essence 
of the Prometheus Quest was, therefore, that each man was king over himself, and 
master of his own fate. 
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between man and nature, and hence with God, serves as a solution and also a 
means of escape for him to rid himself from the all-powerful nightmare of 
imagination, the quest of the self. 
Wordsworth, has tried to strive for a harmonious union between man and 
nature. Indeed, the Romantics have strived to convince themselves that this is 
their ideal, and those after them believe that they do succeed. To Wordsworth, 
Coleridge and many critics holding a traditional view, the maturation of the 
psyche has to go through the process as the one shown below: 
Childhood-— Adolescence Adult 
(vision of (widened and (finding all knowledge 
nature as intensified and consolation in 
titanic) consciousness) nature as gifted) 
This is their accepted Bildungsroman process within which, hopefully, man and 
nature can meet in a dialectic of love, through the synthesizing imagination, 
pointing towards redemption, as revealed in "The Prelude," 
…what we have loved, 
Others will love, and we will teach them how; 
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
On which he dwells. (1805 X111:444-448) 
Blake suspects this dialectics proposed by Wordsworth. In fact, there are times 
when confronting natural objects, Wordsworth becomes speechless. Bloom 
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regards Wordsworth's quest in "The Prelude" as "the initial quest phase of the 
poet-as-Prometheus" ("Internalization" 19)，the struggle is hidden, yet everywhere. 
Like Prometheus who violates Jupiter's law in stealing the fire, and Satan who 
revolts against God in Milton's Paradise Lost, Wordsworth-as-child grows toward 
consciousness in his violation of natural law and order, as he finds the boat in the 
cave, unchains the boat, and rows out into the centre of the lake.^ ^ Wordsworth 
has fled, but the "grim shape" still haunts him, giving him a feeling unknown 
which sustains for a couple of days. This feeling is not a remembrance of natural 
objects' shapes and forms, but something mighty and powerful that moves through 
his mind and troubles his dreams. 
Actually all through "The Prelude," the confrontation or contact with nature 
arouses in Wordsworth certain feeling that is most vital to his own soul, as she 
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity, whereto 
With growing faculties she doth aspire, 
With faculties still growing, feeling still 
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet 
Have something to pursue. (1850 11:316-322) 
In his encounter with nature, Wordsworth remembers how he felt rather than 
what he felt, this is what Wordsworth addresses as a "possible sublimity." this 
u See the lines from Book I of "The Prelude" I quoted earlier in this chapter. 
I 
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sublimity, very much resembling Kant's, is the unknown portion of our mind, a 
sense of greatness in imagination, that even our imagination itself cannot 
comprehend or represent. Wordsworth's quest is actually the search for the 
autonomy of his imagination, his subjectivity, unlike what he believes to be nature. 
His quest for the self is no doubt a very unwilling one, he never in his life wants 
to do away with nature, and he can never admit that instead of striving for a unity 
between man and nature, he is uniting him with himself through his imagination 
(Bloom, "Internalization" 23). 
Imagination can be freed if a natural object "ceases to be purely external and 
fades out of its object status" (Bloom, Visionary 149), but Wordsworth refuses to 
do so, always. He has chosen to diffuse the unknown strength, the sublimity into 
the landscape, rather than accepting it to be there, like Shelley who faces Mont 
Blanc and admits openly that the power is there. Wordsworth is at a loss when 
he fails to find a theme for his epic, but as Hartman remarks, he already has it, 
it is himself ("Romanticism" 53). 
The English Romantic poets have all started out with the internal quest for 
the self, and immediately realise that it can be a painstaking and even fatal 
process. Shelley, Blake and Keats all reveal in their poems that self-consciousness 
cannot be overcome (Hartman, Romanticism 49). Or, as suggested by Fichte, the 
process of overcoming is a continuous concern, not whether it can be overcome, 
but the process of trying, the desire to overcome. This internalised quest, this 
overcoming of the self-consciousness, as encouraged by poetry and imagination, 
farther affirms the existence of the "I, ” the subject, everywhere in their poems, 
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no matter whether they are the Prometheus in Shelley, the Satan in Milton, or the 
Wordsworth in himself. Even Christ, to Edinger, is a Paradigm of the 
individuating Ego, and "to take up one's own cross" would mean to accept and 
consciously realise one's own particular pattern of wholeness" (135). The 
Romantic poets, in this sense, parallel the Christ in Edinger, in that they, in the 
realm of their minds，internal heaven, realise their own particular pattern of 




THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF SHEN AND LIU XIE，S SHEN-SI 
The first chapter has traced the development of imagination from the ancient 
Greek all the way down to the German and English Romantic Period. After so 
long a period of negligence and contempt, imagination has finally risen to its 
zenith, enjoying a prestige and respect that it never had before. The Romantic 
poet-critics have awaken to the fact that they have to trace beyond their rational 
faculty for the source of creativity. They hope that imagination can become, in 
Coleridge's terms, an "esemplastic" or "shaping" force, which can unify man with 
nature. Ironically, the more they want to come out of themselves and be one with 
nature, the more they turn inward to themselves, to their own ego. 
In comparison, the Chinese do not have so comprehensive a tradition of the 
concept (or a similar concept) of imagination in their history of philosophy and 
literature. The reason is that Confucianism, which has dominated the thinking 
pattern of the Chinese for more than two thousand years, has moulded the people 
into a race that is largely pragmatic by orientation. 
However, it does not mean that, in the Chinese literary and philosophical 
tradition, this "free faculty of the mind" which corresponds to the Western 
imagination is totally absent or ignored. Critics like Cao Pi 考 i ， L u Ji得錢 
and Liu Xie 场 雜 all recognise this mysterious region in us that is captivating. 
Liu has made a very serious attempt to explore this faculty which he calls shen-si 
钟 JB • In his work on literary theory, Wen-xin Diao-long {Literary 
Mind And The Carving of Dragons), he has devoted a section to a discussion of the 
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I attempt to discuss the complete process of Liu's shen-si and its relation to the 
Western imagination. My major concern, however, is to look at shen-si in terms 
of the interaction between subject and object, the idea of shen yu wu you If ^ 
fc?2L(the shen roams with the object).: Liu Xie's shen-si requires both 
emptiness/tranquility and knowledge. We shall soon discover that the two are 
apparently contradicting concepts. Nevertheless, I want to show how the two 
complement each other. 
Western thinkers have, ever since Plato, developed a tradition of thinking 
which is largely rational and antithetical. They believe in reason and 
understanding while at the same time despise images. In China, however, 
thinkers such as Laozi and Zhuangzi advocate xu-jing 4 • (emptiness and 
placidness) and Yi-jing idea of li-xiangyi jin-yi i- ^ (building image to 
exhaust idea), implies that idea precedes immage. Zhuangzi says that if we want 
to be at one with the universe, we have to achieve xu-jing, since, 
？、 " W g )乏爆…，秦你 I氣也• ••.各石如發， 
Such is the clearness of still water, and how much greater is that of 
the human Spirit! 
The still mind of the sage is the mirror of heavy and earth, the 
1 Originally Vincent Shih's version reads, "the spirit roams with the object." I replace 
here "spirit" with ''shen" The reason for this I shall explain later on in this chapter. 
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glass of all things. (Translation Legge，s) 
In other words, this xu-jing is the means to liberate and at the same time embrace 
all things. Zhuangzi's discussion on xu-jing opens the gate for shen-si to come, 
since Liu Xie，s hsen-si emphasizes xu-jing in artistic/literary creativity, and I am 
going to touch on that later on in this chapter. 
Beside Zhuangzi's idea of xu-jing, there is also in Yi-jing \ 冷(r/ie Book 
of Changes) the idea of building image to exhaust idea: 
^ “ i ? � 1 � i 隨，vb TK 許甚； > 
象 条 灼 该 谓 i t -
The sage was able to survey all the complex phenomena under the 
sky. He then considered in his mind how they could be figured, 
and (by means of the diagrams) represented their material forms 
and their character. Hence these (diagrams) are denominated 
semblances (or emblematic figures, the Hsiang[xiang]). 
This is the so-called guan-wu xu-xiang 叙 狗 申 ^.(seeing objects and adopting 
images). The object perceived is actually natural objects, or objects from 
everyday life. The images adopted are those that imitated substantial objects, 
they turn into something called yi-xiang 冬 ^ (images of change) which has 
symbolic meaning. These yi-xiang is not separable from object and images, and 
this image-oriented mentality influenced largely the artistic thinking in ages that 
come after." Liu Xie's shen-si suggests shen-yu wu-you 細約 ] ^，S i - k o n g Tu 
in his Shi-pin (Classes of Poetry) also advocates imitating the 
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s^inX/shen and adopting the images, yet Si-kong's emphasis is on the likeness of 
sgini/shen rather than on the appearance.^ 
As early as the Han Dynasty, the capturing of spinX/shen and the forming 
of images have become something indispensable in Classical Chinese poetics, in 
fact, Chinese in general have developed a pattern of thinking that is experiential 
rather than rational. Thus they have a very high regard for images. However, it 
was only until the end of the Han Dynasty that poet Cao Zhi 考 孤 in his Boo % 
Dao ("Precious Sword Narrative") first introduces the term shen-si. 
He says shen-si is the ability to make image. 
i h ^T % I I 
Use shen-si and make images. 
Kong-rong KJ s^t in his Jian-chen heng biao 右 销 銜 4 ("A Letter of 
Recommendation") also addresses such a state of mind as si mo you-shen 溶毫节 
( to think as if having spirit). 
Among the classical poets and critics, Lu Ji is the first one who has 
devoted much space and effort to discuss this free faculty in the mind in relation 
to literary creation. Lu Ji in his Wen-fu 5 {Rhymeprose on Literature) talks 
2 Yang Ting-zi says Si-kong's Shi-pin on shen and not on appearance 
(138). Sun Lian-gui 漆聯冷 suggests Shi-pin aims at imitating the shen and adopting 
images. He says that by using the right image, one can really，see，the universe, (146). 
For all these comments see the appendix of Er-shi si shi-pin complied by Gong peng-
Cheng f ‘ 钱 . 
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about the procedures for achieving creativity: (i) high concentration, (ii) deep 
thoughts roaming up and down, back to the past and forth to the future, and (iii) 
merging feelings, sentiments, images and languages into a whole. However little 
does he touch on the preparation process and the personal qualities which are so 
vital to this mystical faculty of our mind. Lu does realise the existence of this 
power, but all he can say about it is that it comes and goes as it wishes and 
nobody is able to exercise control over it. He says in his Wen-fu, 
^ % ^ 榮为乏叫秦、， 
Although the faculty is in me, it is beyond my ability. So time and 
again I caress my heart and feel miserable, that I still cannot figure 
out what inspires or obstructs this faculty, (translation mine) 
Cao Pi, who came before Lu Ji, also sees the ability of the mind to create as 
something gifted. He believes that only genius can create literature, and he 
comes to deny craft and the possibility of passing this ability from one generation 
to another. However, it is not until Liu Xie that a full-fledged discussion of this 
creative faculty comes into being. Liu Xie calls this creative faculty shen-si. For 
a long time many scholars and critics tended to equate Chinese shen-si with the 
Western imagination. No doubt there are certain similarities between the two, 
but I believe there is also uniqueness in shen-si that is particularly Chinese. I 
shall leave the comparison of Chinese shen-si and Western imagination to the 
• 
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beginning of the next chapter. Meanwhile, I shall first define the Chinese concept 
olshen, and then discuss the various English translations of shen-si. 
THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF SHEN AND THE VARIOUS TRANSLATIONS 
OF SHEN'SI 
Many translators and scholars of comparative literature have tried to find an 
appropriate translation for the term shen-si. Vincent Shih translates it as 
"spiritual thought or imagination, "and many others just equate it with 
"imagination" without a second thought.^ Taking a closer look at the two 
concepts, we may see that there are more fundamental differences than 
similarities between the two. 
To begin with, I need to define first of all, what shen and si are in the Chinese 
context. According to Ci-hai % t ^ ^，shen ^ carries the meaning of "god," "a 
creator who made the world;" "something holy, boundlessly mystic and unknown;" 
"spirit," "intuition,"and "mutability" as inshen'hua^<ay "spiritual communication" 
as in shen-jiao^ I ; "showing colours, moods, and state of health" as in shen-se 
3 Donald Gibbs considers Vincent Shih's translation of shen-si as "imagination" to be 
the best available, while he himself has named the section in which he discusses shen-si 
"Meditation." I shall deal with Gibbs and some other critics' translation later on in this 
chapter. 
4 Individual Chinese characters carry certain meanings of their own. These are basic 
meanings which can be changed, complicated, or extended if the characters are made 
into compounds. The centre-character based on which the compounds are made, as 
"shen" in this case, can include all the meanings that are generated from the compounds. 
’ ‘ 
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^ 各；immediate knowing and consciousness of," as in shen-wu ^ 怯；the style, 
the taste, the appearance, as in shen-cai 神条 . 
The other word, si % ，means "thinking" or "thought•” It also means 
"consideration," "dreaming about," "remembrance," "to adore," "to sympathise." 
The word, however, means more. It includes "care," "concern," and "the injection 
of idea and emotion," which is actually they/ (idea) in Chinese, as suggested in 
si-cuntor "forever remembering," "not letting go to obliviousness," as in si-fu 
；or "thinking as to find out," as in si-suo . 
Many critics have pointed out that imagination and shen-si are two very 
different concepts, and therefore they try other translations beside "imagination" 
for shensl Vincent Shih must have found it inadequate to translate shen-si as 
"imagination," so he also gives an alternative translation for the term: "spiritual 
thought;" Wang Meng-ou ？等离 and Gibbs take shen-si as "meditation" (Wang 
5; Gibbs 68-77), Chi Chiu-lang calls it "spiritual (or mysterious, divine) 
thinking/thought" or "mysterious working of the mind"(124)，while James l iu calls 
it "thinking with the spirit" or "intuitive thinking" (33). 
Obviously, Gibbs and Wang's translation as "meditation" is the most unsound 
translation of all, since behind shen-si there is a whole set of very complex and 
sophisticated implications and suggestions whereas the word "meditation" is far 
too "flat," to borrow Forster's term.^  Vincent Shih's "spiritual thoughts" is a 
5 Originally E.M. Forster uses the word "flat" to describe characters in novels or plays 
that are 'constructed round a single idea or quality." see his "Flat and Round Characters" 
in The Theory of the Novel Here I borrow the word to suggest that the meaning 
generated by "meditation" is far too simple and unsuggestive to be the Western 
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better translation, but this noun phrase is apparently inadequate to stand for 
shen-sL As a matter of fact, shen-si is more than a state of mind: it is a process, 
a force that can wander about. Chi Chiu-lang is more brilliant by choosing 
continuous forms "thinking,"and "mysterious working of the mind," which suggest 
shen-sfs progressive nature, while James Liu is even better in his choice of 
"intuitive thinking" in addition to "thinking with the spirit." The word "spirit," 
according to Webster's Dictionary，carries the following meanings: life principle in 
man as a creature bestowed by a deity; thinking, motivation, feeling part of a 
man; will, consciousness, thought, which is regarded as separate from matter; a 
supernatural being, either good or bad; the personality and special quality of an 
individual; frame of mind, disposition, mood, temper; as vivacity, courage, vigor, 
enthusiasm; a pervading animating principle, essential or characteristic, a 
prevailing tendancy or attitude, etc. The rich meaning "spirit" coincides largely 
with those of shen. Also, Liu's other word "intuitive," implies "the immediate 
knowing or learning of something without the conscious use of reasoning; 
instantaneous apprehension."^ It thus resembles significantly the immediacy and 
readiness in shen-sL However, these words are still not perfect enough since 
there are certain qualities in the Chinese shen-si which are too difficult to be 
expressed in English-the so-calltd feng-shen qi-du )瓦钟 H , the shen-yun 
counterpart of shen-su 
6 'The meanings of，spirit, and，intuitive，I have taken from Webster's Dictionary. 
* 
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^ ^ ，something which can be felt but not expressed. It is what Si Kong-tu 
^ ^ regards as the taste beyond flavors: 
於 . ， 1 l)：於诚 
� b � 其 々 敏 i � 
Plums taste only sour, salt tastes only salty, a meal 
cannot be without the taste of sourness and saltiness, 
yet the beauty of taste is often beyond these two 
flavors^ (translation mine) 
This so-called "taste" is a transcendental sensation which can be felt but not 
traced. The taste is the shen of the flavors, it is the realm that the Western word 
"spirit" does not suggest. One may recognise from the meanings given above that 
objects are not regarded as possessing spirit, since "spirit" is the "will, 
consciousness and thought which is regarded as separate from matter." It explains 
why "spirit" fails to be the Western counterpart of the Chinese shen, since objects 
in the Chinese sense have their own shen, while objects in the West have not. 
• We have said that shen exists not only in us but also in objects. Wang Fu-zhi 
defines shen in two senses: it can mean the poefs spirit and intuition, or the 
7 This I quoted from Ci-hai 綠 iSt under the word shen. Upon this，taste beyond 
flavour' see Chen Guo-qiu's introductory annotation in Si Kong-tu，s Er-shi-si shi-pin. 
m 
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spirit and essence of objects. He advocates the intuitive union of one's shen with 
the shen of the object. This is what he regards as "capturing the spirit of things" 
and James Liu equates this with Yen Yu，s ju-shen \ ^ (entering the spirit). 
Wang Shi-zhen ^ -t" defines shen in terms of shen-yun ^t%spiri t and tone) 
(James Liu 37), which implies "intuitive apprehension of reality, intuitive artistry, 
and personal tone." For Wang Shi-zhen, the ultimate goal of poetry is to achieve 
spiritual awakening, which is actually addressed by Yen Yu系菊 as miao-wu^传 
，and finally to commune with Dao. James Liu points out that to make possible 
the communion with Dao, the human shen should encounter that of the object. 
He calls it shen-hui 钟令(the spirit encounters), and shen-dao 特 J i the spirit 
reaches) (40-45). 
The word si cannot be translated simply as "thinking/thought." This is 
because si, in relation to writing, carries the meaning of "emotions" and "ideas" as 
expressed in shi-si 窃 % and wen-si i % . The phrase si eryou-zhi ^ v ^ ^ 
implies a realm of going beyond. What is called Xing-qui by Yen Yu, and yi by 
ZhongRong, 
Be that as it may, the meaning of shen-si is thus more inclusive than all the 
above translations attempted by various critics. Shen-si has all their meanings and 
yet more than those meanings. The best translation is, therefore, not to translate 
8 The word yi ^ comes from Zhong Rong's Shi-pin. It is taken from the original 
phrase wen you jinyiyouyu l ^ i % which I translate a，the literary work ends 
but the menaing lingers on/ Xu Fu-kuan extends the meaning of yi into yi-we] % v奉 




it into any Western counterpart, but leave it as shen-si. 
Although most critics and poets agree on the point that there exists a certain 
realm in our mind and in objects called shen, that shen has to commune with Dao, 
they tend to disagree on the philosophical basis of this shen and Dao, Chen 
Hui-hua 神 要 种 quotes Rao Zong-yi 飽象政 in his article about shen-si, and 
concludes that Liu Xie's idea of shen is deeply affected by his Buddhist 
background (2). For Chen, inspiration comes and goes without trace; it is 
god-given, and so Chen decides that the word shen in shen-si means god, or as 
something amazing and mystic (2). He then proceeds to say that shen, like Dao, 
is without shape and beyond description, and shenis actually Dao. What makes 
him draw the conclusion that Liu Xie's shen is Buddhist and that shen equals Dao, 
Chen does not bother to explain, leaving much ambiguity for the readers to 
ponder over. Shih Leei, in his research on Wen-xin Diao-long and Buddhism 
relates Dao to the Buddist yin-guo 沟尿，9 (cause and result). In his Yuan-dao 
(On Dao the Source), Liu Xie defines human being as: 
i x . 1 I 至叫 
The refined essence of the five elements—indeed, the 
9 Yin in Sanskrit is Hetu; meaning a cause, because; a reason; to follow, it follows; 
that which produces a Kuo . result or effect. See SoothilFs A Dictionary of Chinese 
Buddhist Terms, 
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mind of the universe. Now with the emergence of 
the mind, language is created, and when language is 
created, writing appears. (1:9,0 
According to the above, the heart is the origin from which language is 
created, language is the origin from which writing is created. In other words, the 
heart is the cause, and language is the result, just as language is the cause and 
writing is the result. In a more general sense, the Dao of nature is always a 
product of the Buddhist yin-yuan 因 
According to Vincent Shih, in The Carving of Dragons, Liu Xie has used words 
and phrases like shen (spirit), shen-li I f (a reasonable spirit), shen-dao 种 ^ 
(spiritual path, mysterious truth, mind, intelligent nature, consciousness, principle), 
and so on (Shih Leei 2). Liu Xie discusses human creation and natural beauty 
in Yuan-dao (The Source), 
l i i ?本种评、"？17 & � 
Was anyone responsible? No. They are natural, 
organic expressions of the Divine. (1:10) 
and also in Li-ci ^ ^ (Linguisitic Parallelism), 
10 Unless otherwise stated, all translation of Wen-xin Diao-long I shall quote from 
Vincent Shih. For the sake of clarity I cite them by chapter and page number according 
to the version I adopt. 
u Yin is a primary cause in comparison with Yuan ^，in Sanskrit is Partyaya, which 
is a situational or secondary cause. See Soothill's A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist 
Terms, 
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^t tt X A 从 t � 
The divine reason operates in such a way that 
nothing stands alone. (XXXV: 190) 
Shih Leei concludes from these two lines that the concept shen-li is actually 
the Dao, which allows all worldly phenomena and things to evolve according to 
a cause-and-result relation. However, the most obvious example Shih Leei quotes 
to support Liu Xie's contention that shen is a Buddhist product is in Lun-shou 
(Treaties and Discussion), 
Each may have had a penetrating vision of one aspect of the 
problem, but neither group arrived at the final truth. May not the 
condition in which one's thought is able to penetrate the source of 
the mystery be the ultimate state of Prajnal (XVin:103) 
Here "Prajna" is a Buddhist term which means "to know," "to understand," and 
"wisdom." It is the supreme, incompatible, unequalled and unsurpassed state of 
mind (Soothill 337). This stage of penetrating the source of mystery in order to 
achieve wisdom reveals the very Buddhist domain of supreme understanding. 
Shih Leei succeeds in relating Liu Xie，s Dao and shen to the Buddhist Yin-kuo, 
Yin-yuan and Prajna, and thus claims that shen in Liu Xie is the very product of 
Buddhism. However, of all the examples he has quoted, none is from the chapter 
of shen-si, Shih Leei may be conscious that his Buddhist assumption does not 
apply fully to shen-si as well as it does to Daoist philosphy and so he just by passes 
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this chapter and proceeds to condemn the Daoist teaching. In his Lun-shuo he 
despises the Daoist emphasis on gui-wu \ 赛(non-being), which can reduce 
human beings to the state of "the silent and the void" (XVIII: 103). Shih Leei's 
final conclusion is: the Dao in Liu Xie，s writings is a Buddhist Dao instead of a 
Daoist one. Although Liu's belief is basically Buddhist, and in many of his 
chapters, the Buddhist outlook is beyond dispute, yet "for a complex and syncretic 
theorist like Liu Hsieh [Xie], any blank statement in classifying his thought as 
belonging to a single school is misleading" (Shao 67). Regarding shen-si, Liu Xie 
has apparently adopted the Daoist approach. Of course Liu Xie is very cautious 
in using the Daoist approach, and not like in Zhuangzi's Tian-xia 9"�"f (The 
Historical Phases of Daoist Teaching), 
l ^ i 态 子 I , 不 w � 務 L i 也 . 
V/. L \ % A 树 . w . I t X % , 
w � 
Using strange and mystical expressions, wild and extravagant words, 
and phrases to which no definite meaning could be assigned. He 
constantly indulged his wayward ideas, but did not make himself a 
partisan, nor look at them as peculiar to himself. Considering that 
men were sunk in stupidity and could not be talked to in dignified 
style, he employed the words of the cup of endless application, with 
important quotations to substantiate the truth, and an abundance 
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of corroborative illustrations, (translation Legge's) 
This is never what Liu Xie wants to take as rules for creativity. However, from 
the chapter on shen-si onward, we are able from time to time to locate quotations 
and adoptions of ideas from Zhuangzi. 
The shen in Liu Xie's chapter on shen-si, originates from si, "thinking, 
thoughts," which is aroused by our affection and feeling when encountering objects 
or phenomena. The feeling and affection change with what one sees, and 
thoughts roam far and wide, thus transcending time and space: 
1 5 ； 當 V 後 溶 卷 4 氣 、 • 
Quietly absorbed in contemplation, his thinking 
reaches back one thousand years, and with only the 
slightest movement of his countenance, his vision 
penetrates ten thousand IL (XXVI: 154) 
These roaming and wandering thoughts Liu Xie calls shen, which comes from 
Zhuangzi as the highest realm in nourishing life. When he quotes the story of the 
"mysterious butcher" who cut his bull, he deals with it as a pure spiritual 
encounter. The highest state is when the shen can act as it desires. According 
to Zhuangzi, the supreme man who has reached this realm, 
i i I v .《畔稀链， 
mounts on the clouds of the air, 
rides on the flying dragon, 
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and wanders at ease beyond the four seas. 
The supreme man inXiao-yao you Untroubled Voyage of Enjoyment) 
is also described as the shen-ren 特 C，(the man with shen) who can ride on 
flying dragons and wander beyond the four seas. To put it another way, the 
characteristic of shen is its ability to enable one to travel the four seas. When one 
possess this ability, one is already in a very high spiritual realm. So, even though 
one's body is trapped in the world, the mind can reach the infinite. The supreme 
state of shen is described by Vincent Shih as the realm of pure experience-a state 
which transcends both "the human senses and the intellect, a state in which one 
forgets the entire world, including one's own existence. So finally, one is expected 
to reach a sudden enlightenment when one experiences union with the universe" 
(Vincent Shih 12). 
LIU XIFS SHEN-SI 
From the definition of the words shen and si, and also the various translations 
of the concept, perhaps we should proceed to Liu Xie，s concept of shen-si which 
is quite fully and systematically developed. Ironically, few are able to discuss his 
concept of shen-si in a full and systematic way. Chen Hui-hua aims at giving a 
complete picture of the origin of shen-si, and how we can capture and generate 
this faculty of the mind, but he ends up in giving us fragments which she never 
attempts to explain in full detail, so his whole discussion on shen-si ends in a very 
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brief summary.^ ^ Wang Meng-ou's discussion on "Meditation" in a very general 
one, and he does not seem to have any desire to discuss either Liu Xie's shen-si 
or Coleridge's imagination. The one who has a better analysis of the two is Mei 
Jia-ling ^ 於、but in her discussion there are certain ambiguities and 
confusions.^^ 
Mei Jia-ling classifies imagination into two levels. In its more general sense, 
shen-si is the ability of the mind to travel and wander far, even if the body is 
trapped in certain space-time. Such freedom to travel is found not only in our 
thinking in general, but also in our more specific literary creativity Liu Xie writes, 
支 � E 必 ， i 象， 
One who is engaged in literary thought travels far in shen}"^  
Writing, thoughts and shen are thus linked. In literary creativity the three are 
inseparable, with our shen in a leading position. Like shen in its more general 
sense, the shen in literary creativity, can also reach far. However, this 
far-reaching and carefree character of shen does not move along on its own 
without reason, it is often the objects which initiate the shen in us to move along. 
12 See Chen Hui-hua's essay, "Literary Creativity and Shen-si" in his book of the same 
name. 
Mei Jia-ling classifies shen-si into two levels: the general and the specific. The 
general is, according to her, an ability of the shen of the subject to travel far. And when 
shen-si operates, impressions of past experiences are retrieved from our pool of 
memories as transformed, since the shen of both subject and object have interacted with 
each other. Yet Chen never tells how her idea of "memory" and "impression" come into 
being. 
Originally the translation is Vincent Shih's, but I have deliberately change the word 
"spirit" to shen, for the reasons I have given earlier in this chapter. See note 2. 
' I . . 
» 
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How can this initiation be achieved? Liu Xie explains in the chapter Min-shi 
(An Exegesis of Poetry), 
々 裏 4 i l , 为 购 斯 唇 、 
惑 ^ v ^ ： ^ , ：^、if 令 k 
Man is endowed with seven emotions. When stimulated by external 
objects, these emotions arise in response. In responding to objects 
one sings to express his sentiments. All these are perfectly 
spontaneous. (VI:60) 
The stimulation of man by external objects is only possible when there is a 
common ground for the subject and object to have chemical reactions. This 
reaction is addressed first by the Han philosopher Dong Zhong-shuf,�卞苯，and 
later by Joseph Needham as "resonance." Dong writes, 
15 �勾如令•巻A如 & 
All things reject what is different [to themselves] and follow what 
is akin. Thus it is that if [two] vital force are similar, they will 
coalesce; if notes correspond, they resonate.^^ 
This common ground I believe is shen. I have said that the human shen has the 
ability to travel far and wander wide. But this free wandering is not without a 
purpose. James Liu says, "Liu [Xie], in common with practically all other Chinese 
critics, does not regard things as dead but as possessing their own spirit [shenY 
^ Translated by E.R. Hughes in Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times. (London: 
Everyman Library, 1942), 305. 
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Even if both human beings and objects possess their own shen, it does not mean 
that the two can go on an immediate excursion together: certain requirement has 
to be reached. To put it in a very simple way, the natural objects，shen can only 
be reached if the artist possesses a certain kind of sensibility that is in line with 
that of the object. In other words, the shen of a particular object is revealed only 
to the artist whose temperament is right for the object" (Shao 71). On this 
common ground when the shens of the subject and the object resonate, they can 
freely go on an excursion together. Once they have gone on a joint excursion, it 
has to be verbalised in sound and rhythm, and then expressed in words and 
writing. In what follows we are going to take a look at the two stages oi shen-si 
in literary creativity: the first is "the shen roaming with the object," and the second 
is "holding up a pen and completing a piece." For an easy explanation, I have 
borrowed Mei Jia-ling，s diagram of the process of shen-si, and for easier 
understanding I have made some modifications where necessary.^^ 
The original flow-chart is in Chinese, and I have translated it into English. The 
chart here is simplified and modified, and I have also added in the shens of the object 
without which there can be no excursion between subject and object, and hence no shen-
si possible. 
• " • V • « 
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process of \/ 
shen-si sense organs 
the spirit roams with 
the object 
rhetoric and language 
finding appropriate rhythms which are 
in harmony with intuitive insight 
� f 
completed piece of writing 
STAGE ONE: THE SHEN ROAMS WITH THE OBJECT 
To let the shens of subject and object go on an excursion, Liu Xie points 
out that one should first of all achieve xu-jing. However, Liu Xie does not give 
any explicit explanation, and it is again left to all sorts of interpretations. 
Basically, most critics believe that the concept of xu-jing comes from the Daoist 
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thinking of Lao-Zhuang. Laozi, when asked what is perfect Dao, replies that we 
should cleanse and purge our mind and do away with our knowledge (Chi 129), 
while Zhuangzi encourages us to reject and forget ourselves completely: 
1% ^ -j、！1 , v t i 取 0 这 
/合寧饰 % , 义 r g 务 演 。 
Drop your form and body, reject your hearing and eyesight, forget 
your place in the hierarchy of things, then you may join in great 
unity with the infinite, (translation James Liu) 
When one is at the stage of self-oblivion, one does not feel the barrier between 
the "subjective consciousness and objective reality, but will identify with everything 
in Nature," so that finally wu-hua "ft? ^ ftJCtransforming with the thing) can be 
achieved. Only by xu-jing and self-forgetfulness can we be at one with the object 
and hence, the Dao. 
Many critics are captivated by the Daoist idea of doing away with knowledge, 
the self and the mind. Su Dong-po 裔牵卞衷 writes, for instance, 
善 3 4 , • ”备 
Being still, one can therefore understand the movements of the 
multitudes of things; 
Being empty, one can therefore receive ten thousand worlds, 
(translation James Liu) 
This shows clearly the influence of Daoist emptiness and tranquility. This 
influence has extended to shen-si, and Liu Yong-ji 条跨 when talking about 
shen-si, has the following comments: 
〜 力 今 乏 : 萬 T • ， 免 ， 务 氣 
i錄、各衫二 - 叙 > 圾 良 S 才 知 
The two words "emptiness" and "tranquility" come from Laozi's idea 
of adhering to tranquility to achieve emptiness.Only emptiness has 
the capacity to receive, and only tranquility has the ability to 
illuminate. The capacity to receive is just like an universe 
containing all phenomena, while the ability to illuminate resembles 
the mirror that can reflect all appearances and shapes. Absolute 
tranquility and clarity without dust is the highest domain of 
emptiness. (Mei 43; translation mine) 
Other critics and poets have different views about this Daoist emptiness and 
stillness. James Liu, when discussing the expressive and technical theories in 
Chinese literature, suggests that Liu Xie has modified the Daoist concept of 
mental emptiness and combined it with other concepts. James Liu only points out 
that l iu Xie, in quoting Zhuangzi's words, is not referring to the Confucian idea 
of "empty, single-minded, and still." This state of mind is never a matter of 
concentration and riddance of preconception, but what it actually is James Liu 
does not say. Upon this concept of xu-jing, Liu Xie himself has made a very good 
illustration. He says, 
办 • V ^ � , 义 格一 、 4 
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Water must be still to reflect, 
Fire must be quiescent to burn bright. (XXXXII: 329，translation 
mine) 
In Gibbs，words, it is the idea of withdrawals-a wintering for the soul to 
regenerate the creative faculty (74). Chi Chiu-lang also has a very good 
discussion on xu-jing. Chi believes that xu-jing is the purging of the mind to a 
stage where our creative mind can function. By ridding our petty ego, we can 
elevate our mind to a cosmic level to interact with external objects. It is, so to 
speak, not mere nothingness (Chi 130). To return to our discussion on shen-si: 
James Liu has summarised the mental process of creativity in five stages (124-5), 
and I would like to take his second, third and fourth stages to explain the concept 
of the shen roaming with the object: 
1. The reciprocal: objects appeal to the writer's senses; the writer responds 
emotionally. This refers to experience at the sensuous-emotional level and to the 
time before writing. 
2. The receptive: the writer empties his mind and keeps it still so as to be 
receptive of cosmic Dao. This refers to intuition in its quiescent mode, and to the 
time immediately before writing. 
3. The projective: the writer projects his own feelings into objects. This refers 
to intuition in its active mode, and to the time immediately before or during the 
process of writing. This process of reciprocal, receptive and then projective stages 
thus leads to the union between subject and object, and finally to an ultimate 
stage of ym-wo hu-fen ^^ ii; ；} >^the object and I are inseparable), and zhu-ke 
• ‘ . 
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huen-ran ； ^ 政(the subject and the object mingle together). 
PICKING UP THE PEN AND COMPLETING A PIECE 
When the stage of the "shen roaming with the object" is reached through the 
inducement of "vacuity and quiesence," the time has come to pick up the pen and 
complete a piece. This is no doubt a part of shen-si as a process. One has to 
make the idea, the meaning, and even the essence, take shape from the thinking 
with shen. Thus language and writing substantiate the yi (emotion, idea and 
meaning). Substantiating a process from abstract to concrete; when it is done the 
whole process of shen-si is also completed. This, however, is never a easy step to 
take, since, as Liu Xie himself says, 
t 其 询 餘 ， 表 4 缺 t l , 警 务 答 i ； , 
斗 中 V P 於 。 i l l 
t 敝变 III 乂。 
At the moment when a writer first picks up his pen, and before any 
thing has yet been written, he feels as if his creative vigor were 
doubled; but at the completion of the piece, he usually has 
succeeded in conveying only half of what he had at first 
contemplated. Why is this so? Because one's ideas may easily be 
extraordinary when he is free to work in the realm of fancy, but it 
is very difficult for one to give beauty to his language when he is 
tied down to the factual details. (XXVI: 155-6) 
Facing the difficulty of this stage of shen-si, Liu Xie points out the importance 
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of internal talent and external acquisition of learning. Obviously, "knowledge is 
a necessary preparation for writing, and talent is the agent that leads in the 
creative activity" (Chi 125). A successful piece of art, therefore, depends heavily 
on the harmonic cooperation between the two: 
魂 考 V / � 餘 嗜 ， 紛 怎 才 • If阅W�笼孫• 
I 冬 ； 遏 么 乏 … . . V 人 L I 1 柯 ， 
练 客 I / � 為。 
One has also to acquire learning in order to maintain a store of 
precious information, and to contemplate the nature of reason so 
as to enrich his talents; he must search deep and experience widely 
in order that he may exhaustively evoke the source of light; he must 
draw upon literary traditions in order to make his expressions 
felicitous and smooth. This, in short, is the first step in the art of 
writing, and the main principle employed in the planning of literary 
piece. (XXVI: 157) 
The two are complementary: talent is the force that leads the creative act, while 
learning assists talent in this whole act. Learning absorbs tradition, forming a 
base allowing talent to innovate. In other words "pieces of acquired knowledge 
.• • depend on the writer's ability to select and insert elements and arrange them 
into an organic pattern" (Chi 125-6). 
At this point the whole process of shen-si is completed, but there remains a 
contradiction between the two essentials in shen-si, namely xu-jing, and the 
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conjunction of talent and learning. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, xu-jing 
implies what Laozi says: we have first and most of all to give up our knowledge, 
and let our heart be cleansed and purged in preparation for the reception and 
pursuit of the shen of the object and later on to interact with it. However, Liu 
immediately suggests the indispensability of acquiring knowledge in operating 
shen-si. The obvious incompatibility between xu-jing and the need to learn can 
be seen in James Liu's summary of the creative process, which begins with the 
investigating, followed by the reciprocal, the receptive, the projective and finally 
the creative stage (125). 
James Uu's investigative stage contradicts his receptive stage in the sense that 
the writer has to accumulate knowledge which he later has to clear his mind of. 
James Liu sees the contradiction and he justifies himself by noting that Liu Xie 
"has departed from Laozi and Zhuangzi to the extent that he does not reject 
rational knowledge or emotional rapport with objects" (125). Again, in what way 
departed from them he does not explain. Yet if we take a closer look at l iu 
Xie's tranquility and the acquisition of knowledge, we see that they actually 
belong to two different levels in the process of shen-si. It should be noted that 
xu-jing is required in the stage of preparation for the shen of subject and object 
to interact and then go on an "excursion" together, while knowledge and talent are 
needed for the actual literary composition to substantiate shen-sL Tranquility and 
learning, therefore, are tools required by two different stages of operation, and 
there is no direct contradiction that makes them incompatible. 
‘ ‘ . 
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CHAPTERS 
TMAGE-FQRMTNG AND IMAGINATION IN STNO-WESTERN 
PERSPECTIVES 
In the first two chapters I have discussed the tradition of imagination in the 
West and the concept of shen-si in China. Critics, when talking about the two 
have to, almost inevitably, compare the similarities and differences between them. 
Some critics, like James Liu, have decided right from the start that the two are 
different, and so they do not bother to look for resemblance between them. 
Others who attempt to touch on their similarities find it a pains-taking process: 
Chen Hui-hua first intends to discuss their similarities but turns out to have 
suggested absolutely nothing, while Mei Jia-ling，with all her effort, figures out 
that to both of them there is the interaction between subject and object, and they 
agree on the same ground that literary creativity is the production of thoughts, 
reasons and feelings. In fact, there is a general tendancy for the critics to focus 
more on the differences between Romantic imagination and shen-si, and they are 
simply happy to conclude that the two are very distant products out of two 
different cultures, thought-patterns and creative formulae, thus they deviate in 
processes of development and their respective results (Mei 152). This conclusion 
sounds trivial, if not too simple to be true. No doubt the two concepts are very 
different things, but it does not mean that there is nothing in commom in the 
creative processes East and West. Warnock, instead of defining imagination in 
abstract terms, traces the working of imagination in the formation of images and 
even in our very perception of objects. I am soon discover that where there is 
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perception, there is imagination. What we are going to do now is to look at 
imagination from its very elementary level-that of image and perception, and to 
locate them in the Chinese context, in order to see to what extent or in what way 
is classical Chinese poetry is imaginative. To begin with, let us first look at the 
comparison between imagination and shen-si. 
Coleridge, in his discussion on imagination, says that imagination is essentially 
vital, whereas all objects (as object) are essentially dead {Biographia 1:304). 
Those who try to distinguish between Western imagination and Chinese shen-si 
often begin with Coleridge's idea of "dead" object, in contrast to objects in the 
Chinese sense as possessing spirit {shen) of their own. On this major point, 
however, James Liu refuses to go any further. In fact, he jumps to the conclusion 
that imagination corresponds only to the active modes (i.e. the projective and the 
creative stages in his analysis), and therefore to translate shen-si as imagination 
is misleading {Chinese 125). Liu is obviously right in his opinion about shen-si 
and imagination, but he leaves too much unexplained and a more comprehensive 
analysis of the relation between the two is definitely necessary. 
As we all know, the Western tradition of thinking stresses reason, 
understanding and judgement. This spirit extends into the interpretation of the 
relation between subject and object, when actually what Coleridge means by 
Primary Imagination is the individuars power of cognition (Mei 41)，his/her 
recognition and interpretation of external objects. The object is moulded in the 
subjective mind to form impressions. Then comes the famous Secondary 
Imagination to dissolve, diffuse, dissipate and recreate. This is their way of 
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injecting life into the seemingly lifeless object/ as the subject projects their 
subjective feeling and spirit into it to make it live again. It is what James Liu 
regards as the active mode of the creative process, and imagination serves as the 
mediating force in between. 
The Chinese objects, on the other hand, are believed to have their own Shen. 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, it is the shens of subject and object going on an 
excursion together? Chen Hui-hua, in her comparison between imagination and 
shen-si, puts forward the point of divergence between roaming in shen-si and the 
unifying force in imagination. He says that imagination at all events "struggles to 
idealise and to unify"(7)，as suggested by Coleridge, while the Chinese shen-si 
emphasizes the importance of roaming with the object. Shen-si, therefore, is not 
a unifying force, but a force to han she which as far as I understand is to 
nourish, absorb, contain and adjust，� thus in a sense not so mechanical as the 
Western imagination (Chen 7). However, Chen disappoints the readers by not 
1 Jame Liu, Chen Hui-hua and Paul Shao all base on Coleridge's definition and take 
objects in the West as "dead." Krieger in his "Problem of Meaning" addresses objects as 
"seemingly lifeless." "Object-as-lifeless" implies a possibility for the object to be injected 
with life, while "dead" is a term too absolute for the artists to project life, feeling or 
actually whatever into it. An even better substitute is "mechanic," or "object lack of 
vitality." 
2 The shen (essence) of a natural object is only accessible to an artist who has a 
particular kind of sensibility. Since this sensibility or temperament differs in every artists, 
so the shen captured in each artist's work is also different. The shen of a particular 
object can only be revealed to an artist whose temperament is in line with that of the 
object, only in such circumstances can there be reasonance between subject to object to 
achieve the process of roaming with the object." 
3 Since Chen does not explain what he means by han-she. I therefore adopt the 
meanings of these two words from the Chinese dictionary Ci-hai. 
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explaining what he means by han-she and its difference with "unifying." His only 
point of comparison thus sounds tautological. On this point Mei Jia-ling definitely 
has made a more thorough analysis. Like James Liu, Mei distinguishes between 
"dead" objects in the West and the living ones in China. In reaction to the object-
vnth-shen, the subjective mind remains tranquil and still. Such state of mind to 
Wordsworth may be called "wise-passivity" or as Keats says, "indolence." Yet to 
call that "mere passivity" or "indolence" sounds just unfair, and it is actually 
nothing of that sort; rather, it is a step, a strategy to be taken in the whole 
creative process. To make it simple, it is a state of mind ready to allow the shen 
of objects to enter the subjective mind, whose shen reacts with that of the object 
by projecting its own subjective feeling and thinking on it. Mei Jia-ling regards 
it a process from passive to active, to James Liu it is mode followed by projective 
mode of mental activity. Be that as it may, the result achieved is very different 
from that of imagination. The fusion of the subjective and objective shens, each 
entering the other, is an act which allows them to maintain their own spirit while 
at the same time possess that of the other. They are at once autonomous and 
transformed. 
It is also for the above reason that the relation between the subject and the 
object in the Chinese shen-si is a more harmonic one, since the two never attempt 
to get into each other's way and each other's anatomy. The corresponding 
relation in Western imagination, however, is never quite the same as that in shen-
sL The subject in the West transforms the object into something which is no 
longer the original object, and because of this threatening of autonomy that the 
� 
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two spheres are often in a tensely confronting relation."^ 
Another point of divergence I would like to add here is one that is often 
neglected by comparative-critics, namely, the discrimination of fancy from 
imagination, as suggested by Coleridge. In Chinese Shen-si we have no obvious 
distinction between them. This has much to do with the different treatment of 
order, perspectives, time and space in the two traditions. The French 
philosopher, Diderot, insists that imagination should be bounded. It can come out 
of ordinary process of thing in its operation, but this should be framed and 
worked out with confinement. Lessing in Laocoon has set rigid spatio-temporal 
rules to distinguish between the realms of poetry and painting. To him, time 
belongs to poefs realm of expression, while space belongs to that of the painter. 
The one who intrudes the domain of the other cannot be regarded as possessing 
good taste.5 Shen-si, however, operates in a traditon when the overall 
atmosphere in art and literature is to transcend time and space.^ It is this spatio-
temporal transcendence that allows shen-si the greatest freedom, as Lu Ji says, 
4 See Chapter One of this thesis. 
5 This strict observance of time and space can be exemplified by the adoption of 
single-viewpoint perspective in the West. Even since the Renaissance, when the study 
of mathematics, geometry and physics is booming. Further discussion on this will be 
found in later part of this chapter. 
6 Hwang Mei-shu in his article "Where is I in Classical Chinese Poetry" says that 
"Chinese artists neither observe nor ignore the physical world of time and space." The 
Chinese can juxtapose in their poetry or painting objects from different time and space. 
They can be flowers and birds of different seasons, or things from different perspectives. 
. 香港中文大學圔書馆藏 - F ] 
64 
lii 令於父，丧、、？? •浴於-目》 
He observes past and present in a moment, 
And covers the four seas in the twinkling of an eye. 
� 
He encages Heaven and Earth with Form, 
And defeats the myriad things at the tip of his 
writing brush, (translation James Liu) 
It is this total freedom that makes the distinction between fancy and imagination 
unnecessary. This freedom of shen-si imposes the least on things and can let 
them be themselves, yet still makes the poet to, in James Liu's words, "capture 
eternity and infinity in one's writings" {Chinese 33). 
Up to this point we have had a little survey of a few comparatists，idea on the 
differences between imagination and shen-si. I have said in the previous chapter 
that there are more fundamental differences than similarities h^tN^tn shen-si and 
imagination, and therefore to translate shen-si as imagination is inappropriate. 
Basically, those critics are right in pointing out the difference I regard as 
fundamental-that between the definition and treatment of subject and object; 
only that they left too much unexplained. I have tried to fill in the gaps left by 
them, and when possible given a fuller account of their ideas. As a matter of fact, 
few critics really regard imagination as the exact Western counterpart of Chinese 
shen-si, those who translate shen-si as simple as imagination just prove themselves 
to be irresponsible for they usually have little or no intention to make an in-depth 
‘ 
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comparison between the two. Those who have a heart for such an analysis are 
inclined more toward their differences rather than similarities. If there have been 
anything they find similar, those points are just superficial and trivial. 
Imagination to many Chinese-Western comparatists is something uniquely 
Western that governs their respective poetics, just like Chinese shen-si rules over 
Chinese poetry. 
To put it in the simpliest way, imagination and shen-si share the common 
ground that they both emerge out of the interaction between subject and object; 
while almost all their divergences originate out of their different concepts about 
the nature of an object, and to do so the two are in tense confrontations; whereas 
in shen-si the subject and the object are in a harmonic relation as the two go on 
an excursion together. This conclusion is basically right, only that it sounds too 
vague, if not too simple. However, many critics are just contented to stop there, 
what happens next and where does this seemingly apparent difference leads to, 
we do not know. Here in this chaper I intend to go one step further: I want to put 
aside objects for a while, and to place my investigation on imagination and shen-
si'% common product, namely the image. As suggested by Waraock, there are 
certain features of imagination that "emerge as essential and as universal" (9). 
This essential universality (or universal essential) I would say is the forming of 
images. I have said earlier that shen-si cannot be taken a the Chinese counterpart 
of Western imagination. Now I would like to introduce the modem Chinese 
translation for imagination, namely Xiang-xiang Mr ^ ^ (literally translated as 
"think-image"). Reader may wonder how exact such modem translation is, when 
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imagination (especially productive imagination) really means thinking with images, 
or the forming of images when one thinks. In Warnock's words, "it is a kind of 
consciousness, a way of thinking of something" (162). Upon this we shall find that 
they divorce in their treatment of the images again. My proposition is: images in 
Western aesthetics from Renaissiance to the Romantics tend to be looked at from 
a definite viewpoint, while in the Chinese one, as examplified by classical poetry, 
are mobile. It is for sure that images cannot be separated from objects, so even 
though my discussion here is not on objects, in what follows I still have to, 
inevitably, point constantly to objects when I discuss images in Classical Chinese 
and Romantic poetry. 
IMAGINATION AS AN EXTERNAL FORCE ON PERCEPTION 
Image, in its simpliest sense is a literal and concrete representation of a 
sensory experience or an object that can be known by one or more of the senses. 
Hume defines ideas as images, and imagination is the image-making faculty of our 
mind. Image is produced in two ways, I would like to borrow Plotinus' terms, 
calling them "one to many" and "many to one." The first way I call "one to many" 
is when we hear the name of something, we can create an image of a set of 
impressions that suits the name; the second way is after receiving various sets of 
impressions of a certain species or category of things, we can, by our imagination, 
produce an image of a single object which exists continuously. 
Kant also looks upon imagination as an image-forming faculty. The German 
word for imagination is Einbildungskraft, which can be literally translated as "the 
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craft of merging (something) into one picture."? Einbildungskraft is, therefore, an 
ability to form pictures, images or representations, through which sense 
experience and concepts of objects are brought together, Kant says we need 
imagination to apply a concept to a world in perception {Judgment 392). The 
images formed can be an actual picture or a picture on paper. In his Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant describes the steps of that faculty of imagination in forming 
images: 
What is first given to us is appearance, when combined with 
consciousness it is called perception. Now since every appearance 
contains a manifold and since different perception therefore occur 
in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them such as 
they cannot have in sense is demanded. There must exist in us an 
active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I 
give the title imagination. (120) 
Up to this point, the forming of images by imagination is still largely a vehicle 
bringing sense experience to concepts of objects in the world together. They come 
to us in logical steps as suggested by Kant in the above quoted paragraph, one 
after the other in logical sequence: first appearance, then enters consciousness, 
to form perception, and finally imagination steps in to bring all the manifolds of 
appearance and perceptions together. To say so, Kant is actually taking 
perception as before imagination. Perception is only a kind of consciousness upon 
7 Translation mine. 
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appearance, and imagination is an external force lying half-way between 
intellectual part of our knowledge of the world and the purely sensory part. As 
to Hume, imagination is a usual companion of perception, as it confuses 
similarity in perception with the identity of real object {Philosophical 317). To 
both Hume and Kant, sense experience is passive in the sense that we are 
supposed to receive merely the manifold variety of sensations. The part that is 
active is our thought about the world，and these concepts are wholely created by 
us. 
Husserl, when talking about perception , distinguishes between "a thing 
perceived" and "a thing as it is perceived". This distinction serves well Kant's 
idea that imagination applies concepts to the world of perception, transformed 
the external object from "a thing perceived" to "a thing as it is perceived." Such 
is an intentionality from an attention to an object to a meaning we turn our mind 
(Wamock 142). And thereafter an image is formed. In investigating whether 
experience can be reduced to pure phenomenon, Husserl claims that we cannot 
discover a pure experience which does not have some general significance beyond 
itself. This general significance is actually Hume's idea of similarities among 
objects in perception. When we try to observe objects as similar, we are already 
interpreting them in one way or the other (Warnock 146). 
8 By distinuishing between，a thing perceived，and，a thing as it is perceived,，Husserl 
is actually separating imagination from the very act of seeing. 
« 
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IMAGINATION AS AN INTERNAL FORCE WITHIN PERCEPTION 
In what follows, I would like to point out that imagination is not an external 
force imposed on a perception to form image. It is, rather, a force within 
perception. The very act of perception involves thinking and interpreting, and the 
active working of our mind to complete the object perceived, that without 
imagination it is quite impossible, since we have to use images to help us think 
about things, as suggested by Wittgenstein. He believes that "using visual image 
is an inner object (196)." Wittgenstein tries to distinguish between "seeing 
something" and "seeing it [an object] as something." The act of "seeing it as 
something" has various categories, and we are going to look at them one by one. 
The first type is when we see some qualities or parts of an object, and we 
believe that we are seeing the whole object, so we put in our imagination to 
interpret, and complete the whole object within the mind's eyes. For instance 
when we see a man's head, it evokes in us a man's image formed by previous 
experience. So we expand the head to a body with two hands and two legs by our 
imagination and we take this as a human being. In actuality, the human head can 
belong to an animal's body and become a figure of mythology. It is actually our 
imagination that creates the human being. 
The second case is when we see a picture/an object first as one thing, then 
as another. This is Wittgenstein's famous "duck-rabbit" diagram. To see is as a 
duck, or as a rabbit, we are actually seeing not equal aspects of it, it is the idea 
of "noticing an aspect" (Wittgenstein 193). He suggests that "the flashing of an 
aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought" (197). It seems both 
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"seeing and thinking" or even an "amalgam of the two" (Wittgenstein 197). Again 
we have to retrieve from our pool of mental concepts images of ducks/rabbits, 
and complete the image by adding missing qualities to it to make it live. 
The third case is when seeing a certain object during different times, we think 
it is the same thing all through, but there may be some slight difference that we 
have neglected. We may be seeing similarities of various images, but we tend to 
believe we are seeing the identical object as unchanged all through. Hume says 
this is a case when we confuse similarities with identity and it is through the 
working of imagination. 
Other cases also require imagination in the very act of perception, in what 
follows we are seeing a diagram of a circle in a rectangle: 
回 
Yet it can be seen differently as a picture of various things, we can see it as a 
plate on a table, a national flag of Japan or a hole on a wall. The list can go on 
without end; again it demands in us the use of our already-possessed ideas/images 
to the above object we see so as to form an image or idea of something. So "I 
am seeing it as ” is akin to "I am now having this image" (Waraock 190). 
All the while, we are seeing aspects to create the object we intend, and this 
creation requires our imagination to make use of our concepts and images 
previously formed to interpret, to think and to complete the present object 
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perceived. Wittgenstein believes that seeing an aspect of something is actually the 
modifications of the concept of seeing. Warnock ventures to say that all seeings 
are modified, since there is no substance in the world that does not have some 
qualities, so whenever we see something, we are already seeing their qualities 
immediately without second thought even if we only see it as a diagram of "a 
circle in a rectangle," we are already seeing the qualities of a circle, and a 
rectangle in our imagination. Thus there can be no case of perception that is not 
modified in one way or the other (Warnock 191). We see to imagine, and we are 
taken immediately beyond the object right before us. 
Wamock says too, that there are certain features of imagination that "emerge 
as essential and as universal." One of these features, I must say, is the forming 
of images. As a matter of fact, the Chinese is skillful in forming images, but they 
never bother to investigate how images ar formed. James Liu says "we find 
numerous simple images in Chinese poetry, as in any other poetry, for it is the 
nature of poetic language "to be concrete rather than abstract" {The Art 104). It 
is certainly that images, because of their characteristic of possible concreteness, 
are better materials for poetic expressions East and West; yet what I want to do 
here is to look into how images are formed in the Classical Chinese context, and 
since there is no very thorough analysis of the forming of images in China as in 
the West, so we are going to look into images in Chinese poetry to trace how they 
are formed, and to what extent they are imaginative in the Western sense. 
Chinese poetry is famous of its vivid presentation of images, which have a 




"Chinese poet would not force the perspective of the ego upon phenomenon" 
("The Convergence" 5), he calls it cinematic visuality. I have said that absolute 
neutrality/objectivity is never possible in art. Even though high objectivity is 
present in the film image, it is still a neutrality manipulated by the subjective 
director, telling his subjective story. Same for images in poetry, Classical Chinese 
poets uses apparently neutral images to tell their intended theme. We are 
actually seeing the object/world through his subjective eyes, thoughts and 
imagination. As Alain Robbe-Grillet says in his "New Novel, New Man" 
Even if many objects presented are described with great care, there 
is always, and especially, the eye which sees them, the thought 
which re-examines them, the passions which distort them. (Houston 
& Kinder 241) 
Robbe-Grillet's "eye which sees them" brings us back to Wamock's "seeing as 
modified," which suggests that there is no substance in the world that does not 
have some qualities, so whenever we see something, we are immediately seeing 
their qualities. Let us now take a look of a poem by Ma Zhi-Yuan 
• . 
• . . 
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9 For absolute objectivity in Chinese poetry as impossible, see my essay "Subjectivity 
in Chinese Poetry." The Critical Pursuit 2.1 (1991):33-42. I illustratre subjectivity as 
always existing in Chinese Poetry by making use of images in movies and paintings. 
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Withered vine(s) old tree(s) evening crow(s) 
Little bridge(s) flowing water people's house(s) 
Ancient road(s) West wind lean horse(s) 
Evening sun westward setting 
Broken-hearted man(men) at heaven's end. 
Suppose the poet has all those scenes before him, he sees to create those images, 
captures them as individual images, and presents them to the reader. When he 
sees them, he must have seen certain qualities in them, through his imagination. 
So he sees aspects like the vine as withered, the tree as old, and the horse as 
lean, etc. His imagination captures those aspects and qualities he sees, or rather 
he desires, and creates those seemingly real objects before the reader. The 
reader on seeing the words before him/her, may, as suggested by Hume, create 
an image of a set of impressions that suit the name. Different readers interpret 
the image differently and form different images of "old tree" and "lean horse," 
since each one of us is using our own pool of images to think, and to apply them 
to the immediate sense experience before us. According to Wittgenstein, we are 
seeing to interpret. 
From seeing to interpret we proceed to other sense experiences. Sometimes 
imagination can go as far as when we hear or smell an aspect and we create the 
picture-we hear to perceive the image out of sight, thus creating a 3-Dimensional 
world: 
• ‘ ‘ 
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The mist disappears, the sun rises, no one is seen 
The sound of oar(s), mountain(s) and water green, 
(translation mine) 
These two lines by Liu Zong-Yuan 聊 % f j amaze the readers by excluding the 
fisherman on the junk from the scene, but the sound of the oar enables us to 
imagine the existence of the fishermen, and thus we are able to form in our mind 
a picture of fishermen rowing their boats in the greenness of water and 
mountains. Besides, there are poems which allow us to imagine while we smell, 
such as the following two lines by Li Shang-Yin ^ � , i •  
(The flowers) dance when they are falling, 
And after they are swept away 
(I) still smell their fragrance, (translation mine) 
are vivid in presentation especially in the second line, when the flowers are out 
of sight, their smell still lingers on, reminding us of their beauty, and we form 
pictures in our mind immediately. Even when they are out of sight, they are not 
out of mind, and their smell invokes our imagination to form pictures/images of 
the flowers. 
We have explored how we experience an aspect through the various senses 
and to complete the process of forming perception of the image through our 
imagination. Now let us proceed to see an identical object, but of its different 
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aspects. Remember Wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" image, in so far as it is possible 
for us to see the image first as one thing, then as another. The thing itself has not 
altered; it is only that we see the same thing but of different aspects of it. The 
same diagram we can see it as a duck or a rabbit, and similar experience can be 
found in the poem describing Mount Lw. 
後 为 A 省 A 等 
From across it becomes a mountain range; 
From the side a single peak, (translation mine) 
It is an experience of seeing the same object first as one thing, then as 
another. The poet soon discovers his inability of seeing the "true-face" of the 
Mountain Lw. While the Western Romantic philosophers and poets may find this 
experience irritating, the poet here is simply at ease. We shall come back to this 
eventually. Meanwhile, let us proceed to see how far imagination go in the 
Classical Chinese poetics, apart from the similarities we see earlier between 
China and the West in the forming of images. 
What we have been concerning so far is one single image/object perceived, 
but in many Classical Chinese poetry, the poets like to juxtapose images into a 
single poem, they are put side by side without any apparently direct relationship. 
The readers may recall the poem by Ma Zhi-Yuan, in earlier discussion we only 
take out individual images as examples for analysis, here I would like to look at 
this juxtaposition of individual images, how it is made possible, and what role 
imagination plays in this kind of poems. 
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To begin with, many critics have pointed out that the nature of Chinese 
language enables poetry to present images with a sense of presentness and 
immediacy like those presented in paintings and films.^ o So we see apparently 
unrelated images standing side by side without an obvious message brought to us, 
as in Ma Zhi-yuan's poem. MacLeish says that "a poem should not mean but 
be."ii Yip Wai-lim believes that images presented in Classical Chinese poetry 
as such "tend to return to phenomenon itself ("The Convergence" 5). But we 
must realise that "poems are written down in human language with, ultimately, 
an intention" (Ku 350). The reader may recall HusserFs idea of mental activity 
as intentional (Wamock 142), and since imagination is no doubt a mental activity, 
so images thus formed must be with purposes, or in fact, with significance. 
Yet what sort of significance or intention does this kind of poetry imply? 
Among the independent images there are disjunctions, gaps and blanks. Michael 
Riffaterre calls this disjunction "ungrammaticality" (Ku 345). Wolfgang Iser 
believes that this blank is significant since it induces and guides the reader's 
10 Wai-lim Yip calls it the cinematic visuality of images. (See his "The Convergence 
of Language and Poetics.") James Liu says, "Chinese, being a completely uninflected 
language, is not burdened with cases, genders, moods, tense, etc. (See his "Some 
Grammatical Aspects of the Language of Poetry" in The Art of Chinese Poetry); Huang 
Yong-wu also realises the juxtaposition of independent images in Chinese poetry as 
similar to the cinematic effect (see his Chinese Poetics-On Design) which is echoed by 
Luk Yun-tong cinematic alteration("Wang Wei's attitude towards Mountains: His 
perception of Space"), and finally Hwang Mei-shu who sees Chinese verbs as tenseless 
which allow a poem to appear in the present, and resembles a painting or a film. (See 
his "where is I in Classical Chinese Poetry.") 
11 Further discussion by Macleish on words, images and meaning on poetry, see his 
Poetry and Experience. Middlesex: Penguin Book Ltd, 1960. 
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constitutive activity (Iser, 178). This "constitutive activity" I would say is 
imagination. The ungrammaticality not only induces our imagination, but further 
invites it to freedom. (Watson 130-1) of size, shape, color , position and number. 
The unspecification, together with the disjunction, create vagueness and 
indeterminacy, which may be called "ambiguity" by Empson and "plurisignation" 
by Wheelwright. James Liu regards ambiguity as a weakness of Chinese poetry 
(The Art 104). I would say this is a strength rather, since the reader is offered 
greater freedom in reading a Chinese poem than an English one which offers a 
more definite picture. So as we make the "ungrammaticality" grammatical by our 
imagination, we are not only, as Ku Tim-hung says, "entering into the significance 
of the poem" (345), but rather creating the significance of the poem with our 
mind's eyes. 
To see how imagination operates in Chinese poetry, I shall first introduce the 
use of perspectives in Classical Chinese paintings. To digress from our discussion 
on the forming of images by imagination, I plead for patience from readers at this 
stage, and I hope in the end, the apparent digression will be found to be relevant 
to our overall discussion in this thesis. 
Chinese paintings are unique in their use of multi-perspective techniques. By 
allowing multi-perspective images to exist simultaneously on a single painting, the 
painters are really using a 2-Dimensional media to present a 3-Dimensional world 
(Hwang 32). Feng Zi-kai ^ I 禮in his Painting and Literature, uses a picture of 
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Chou Ying，si2 as example to illustrate multi-perspectivity in painting. Feng has 
drawn a simplified picture of Chou，s painting, and upon the simplified drawing 
Feng discovers that the furnitures inside of the temple are drawn from various 
angles, their various perspectives are as follows: 
VPl - from the top of a high ladder at the eastern corner of the yard when he 
looks at the step, mat, and the central table. 
VP2 - from the centre of the yard when he looks at the shrine. 
VP3 - from the top of a higher position at the centre of the yard when he sees the 
drum & bell 
VP4 - from the top of the shrine when he looks at the two long benches on both 
sides (Hwang 32-33). 
Whereas from a single-viewpoint perspective it should look like the picture on the 
12 Chou Ying is a famous painter of the Ming Dynasty, the paintings adopted by Feng 
in his book Painting and Literature, and hence by me here in this chapter, are on the 
Story of the Western Chamber ^ . 
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right (Feng 79). 
Those who believe in the more scientific single viewpoint regard this multi-
perspective presentation as unrealistic. In fact, in the West, ever since the 15th 
century, the word "perspective" is synonymous with single view-point. Leonardo 
da Vinci writes, 
Perspective is nothing else than seeing a place {sito) behind a pane 
of glass, quite transparent, on the surface of which the objects 
which lie behind the glass are to be drawn. They can be traced in 
pyramids to the point in the eye and pane. (Osborne 841) 
The pyramid is actually straight-line light rays linking the visual objects to the 
eyes. The point where the lines meet is the focus of the visual image. We call 
that the vanishing point, as shown in the diagram below : 
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Such single-viewpoint perspective is a product of the Renaissance when at the 
time the study of mathematics, geometry and physics are booming. For such a 
• . 
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cameratic effect to appear in a painting, Renaissance painters have to create an 
illusion of depth. It was the Italian architect Brunelleschi who gave the artists the 
mathematical means of systematically creating the depth, and he was actually the 
one who invented the system of linear perspective (Janson 310). Bmnelleschi，s 
discovery begins with his wanting to search for an accurate method of recording 
architectural structures on papers, and the discovery is in itself "scientific rather 
than artistic" (Janson 310)，but it immediately becomes extremely vital to early 
Renaissance artists because they think it is objective and rational. It is to them 
a proper way of looking at tilings. Again this thinking can be traced back to their 
epistemological tradition and the scientific development which make them regard 
this multi-perspective technique examplified in Chinese paintings as either 
unrealistic or mere coincidence, if not lack of knowledge in art techniques. 
I would like to point out that this adoption of multi-perspective technique is 
not mere coincidence, but as what Husserl suggests, the artist creates objects 
perceived by endowing particular perceptual experience with significance, or as 
Kant says, applying a concept to a world in perception. But if we look again at 
Chou's painting of the temple, we find that he is not applying a concept to an 
object or to a scene at a time, but various concepts to different objects in the 
same scene at the same time. Hwang Mei-shu, on discussing the Multi-viewpoint 
way of seeing as seeing "psychological reality in time flux," 
It is only natural that before entering the main hall of a temple, a 
visitor see the steps; when he comes into the hall he notices the 
mat and, then, the sacrifice-table in the centre. It may appear 
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strange at this moment that he does not see the shrine and the 
table at the same time, which are placed so closely together. But, 
as we know, the shrine is the most solemn object in the hall, he 
would look at it with a different mood. In other words, his attitude, 
and perhaps his actual position too, begins to change before, or as 
soon as, his eyes turn to the shrine. The drum and bell, two of the 
symbolic instruments of the temple, must be seen in a like mood. 
Then when he turns around he looks at the two side tables. (33) 
I don't quite agree with Hwang's point that the visitor sees the steps when 
entering the main hall, and then notices the mat and the sacrifice table when he 
comes into the hall. In fact, it is rather obvious that the steps, the mat and the 
sacrifice table are of the same perspective, and the visitor must have seen them 
all at the same time, and very likely, it is an impression (and later a concept) 
formed when the visitor is at a higher position looking down at the temple. Feng 
suggests it to be a ladder, I think it is more likely that the temple is situated in 
mountains, and to reach this temple one has to walk down a mountain path, and 
it is the level when the viewer can see the three things at one time, just to miss 
the shrine, since the full picture of it can only be seen when the viewer is on the 
ground level. As for the other parts Hwang's analysis is brilliant in associating his 
seeing with the viewer's mood, attitude and actual position. To say this we are 
bringing ourselves to another vast topic of the Chinese sense of qing-jing jiao-rong 
as Sartre calls the Chevalier-feeling, which is too broad a subject 
for brief discussion here. To avoid further digression for the time being, let us 
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first go back to Chou’s painting. The depiction of the temple hall is complex 
enough with the forming of images of different objects seen from different views, 
as suggested by Feng; it is further complicated by the different perspectives of the 
same object seen at different moments as found in a particular image of object. 
The two side-tables are drawn in a rather normal perspective from outside, but 
then the tops of the two tables show a reverse perspective from inside out. It 
resembles one of Picasso's portraits, that he usually merges the side and the front 
of a person into the same face of a portrait.^^ Such complexity demands greater 
imagination from the artists to put all perspectives together to create a single 
image of reality and naturalness as unique to the artist's psychology, and still 
greater imagination from the reader/viewer to see through to interpret these 
images presented by the artisfs subjective imagination. 
Talking about protraits, perhaps we should also take a quick look at the 
portrayal of human beings in Chinese paintings: 
圖讕 
One example of this kind of portraits is "Portrait de Dora Maaf painted in 1936 by 
Picasso. Now stored in Galerie Broun, Paris. 
• , 
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The picture on the left is again a scene by Chou Ying on Xi-xiang Ji ^ ^ l{j 
(The Story of the Western Chamber) while the one on the left is by Gu Hong-
zhong 麵矢寸 showing a scene of a night gathering? Both pictures show 
"wrong" perspectives in the sizes of the people. The women in both are in the 
foreground and they should appear bigger than the men in the background. By 
so doing the painters have already assigned significance when forming the images, 
but the woman are portrayed small because of their inferior social status, they are 
images formed not according to objective reality, but subjective imagination and 
interpretation. 
Since our discussion has a lot to do with poetry of 
I ； 
:‘ [ I ) , natural landscape and objects in nature, I shall 
introduce one last painting. I hope that is not too 
I ' ^ f i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S ： much and in fact this painting is more directly related 
to those landscape poems I am going to discuss in the 
later part. Hwang says it is difficult to find a multi-
perspective painting in landscape to illustrate his 
argument since "the sizes of trees, rocks, and rivers 
cannot be as easily judged as those of tables, chairs 
； 》 a n d houses" (40)，but here I would like to introduce 
、 卞 a fairly obvious multi-perspective painting in 
’ ISI landscape on the left. 
14 A painting by Gu Hong-zhong, which shows a night gathering. This is a outlining 
of the original painting, which is collected in The Chinese Art History, 
‘ 、： 
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This picture of the landscape is a multi-perspective one. We are looking at the 
mountains and the trees from the front on the same level as theirs. While we are 
looking at the river from a bird-eye view. To be able to see the grass as it appears 
in the painting, perhaps the only way is to sit down or even lie down so as to 
achieve this visual effect. 
From paintings we go back to poetry again, and we notice immediately that 
the use of indefinite perspectives is also widely adopted in Classical Chinese 
poetry. As a matter of fact, Classical painting and poetry in China are twin 
elements of the same entity. Wai-lim Yip's favourite multi-perspective poem is 
definitely Wang Wei's "Mount Chungnan "[Zhongnan] and Yip has traced the 
various perspectives in the poem: 
^ t k s . - I % ^ 
K ^ fc, . I k ^ 
The Chungnan ranges verge on the Capital Mountains upon 
mountain to sea's brim. (VPl- viewer on level ground looking from 
afar) 
White clouds-looking back-close up (VP2 - viewer coming out) 
Green mists—entering—becoming nothing (VP3 - viewer entering) 
Terrestrial divisions change at the middly peak (VP4 - atop peak 
looking down ) 
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Shade and light different with every valley (VPS - viewer on both 
sides of mountain simultaneously) 
To stay over in some stranger's house - Across the water, called to 
to ask a woodcutter (VP6 - viewer down on level ground). 
("Aesthetic" 227) 
I have said earlier the complexity in multi-perspective presentation in art demands 
greater imagination in the artist to create, and the viewer to perceive, which in 
fact is also true in poetic presentation, as in the case of reading "Mount 
Chungnan" From this poem Yip Wai-lim succeeds in deriving a conclusion that 
this multi-perspective presentation enables us to "cross the limit of words into the 
realm of sculpture, toward the art of perceiving a work of sculpture's total 
existence depends on our viewing it from different angles as we move around it" 
("The Convergence" 20). This is also the moment when we as well as the piece 
of art is "liberated"—we are liberated to percieve the whole of the art/poem, while 
the art/poem is liberated to regain its wholeness. 
Yip's reading of poem "Mount Chungnan" offers us only six viewpoints, and 
if Yip believes that by these six viewpoints we can see the whole object of 
perception, he is far too optimistic. I can only accept that the six viewpoints are 
only parts rather than the whole of "Mount Chungnan: For each step we move 
we are seeing more of it, and it is this hope of seeing more of it (not necessary 
the whole of it) that get us going. However, I agree absolutely with Yip that the 
viewer is liberated. The viewer is liberated in the sense that his imagination is 
set free-it is allowed greater freedom to move around in time and space," to 
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move from one viewpoint to another, back and forth, in and out of the world of 
immediatedreality and that of imagination" (Hwang 45). 
I think it is now time to draw a brief conclusion on what we have been 
discussing so far. In regard to the forming of images, China (Classical) and the 
West share a common point: Western philosophers declare in their theory, and 
Chinese poets show in their poetry, that where there is perception, there is 
imagination involved in forming the image-the viewer has to use imagination to 
see beyond the object before him/her in order to create the object perceived. 
He/she has to fill in the disjunctions and complete the picture on his/her own. 
The ambiguity and ungrammaticality, frees our imagination. The difference lies 
in the process they take to form images. Up to the Romantics, the Westerners, 
when encountering an object, choose to look at it from a single-viewpoint. From 
that definite position, the viewer perceives certain aspects of the object, the 
perceivable parts of it. The imagination, therefore, serves not only to perceive the 
parts before the eyes, to form an image of it but also to carry the mission of 
completing the image by providing the missing parts and aspects to make the 
object perceived (or image created) complete. Yet to draw a conclusion by saying 
that the Westerners exercise imagination to form images from a single-viewpoint, 
is a little too simplistic. Indeed, modern philosophers have attempted to break 
with their Romantic predecessors in the function of imagination. Romantic 
imagination has started out with the mission to unify subjective and objective, but 
finally becomes a means to aggrandise the self, the subject. Productive 




the world. This function of interpreting the world goes hand in hand with the 
image-forming. The forming of images is actually our interpretation of the world. 
The Classical Chinese poets, when forming images, choose not to stand in a 
definite position. Multi-viewpoint technique adopted in "Mount Chungnan" shows 
us that the Chinese prefer to look at the object(or the scene) from various angles 
and positions. The mentality of the Classical Chinese poet is not to get hold of 
or conquer the objects in the universe through our imagination, but rather, the 
humble wish of venturing one step further in the hope of seeing more of the 
object before their eyes. If imagination in the Renaissance and Romantics 
enables them to complete or rather create the image of the perceived in order to 
conquer nature, imagination in Classical Chinese poetry is definitely a force 
leading our Shen to roam around or go one step further to see more of the object. 
This finally leads to our concluding Chapter, as we go back to the earlier 
discussion of the relation between subjects and objects, and the Chinese concept 




DTFFFRENT FUNCTIONS OF IMAGINATION IN COMPREHENDING 
NATURE CHTNA AND THE WEST 
I have said that the development of Western imagination, up to the Romantic 
Age, has turned itself into a tool for searching for the individual self. This 
gradual development deviates from the Western philosophers and poets' original 
intention. At the beginning, they looked upon imagination as the force to unify 
the subject and the object. Ironically, instead of establishing a harmonous 
relation between the two, imagination leaves the subject and the object in a tense 
confrontation, as the subject, by means of imagination, manipulates the object to 
satisfy his/her own ego.i In Chinese shen-si, however, we experience a different 
relation between the subject and the object. The subject-object relation in 
Classical Chinese aesthetics and poetics is a harmonous one, as the two never 
attempt to get into each other's way, and they go on an excursion together. For 
such an excursion to be possible, the subject and the object must have certain 
spiritual resonance.^ Up to here we are almost certain that Western imagination 
and Chinese shen-si are different concepts, but does it mean that the Western 
concept of imagination is ruled out completely from the Chinese creative process? 
1 See Chapter one of this thesis. 
2 See Chapter two of this thesis. 
• . 
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Such skepticism leads to my third chapter, in which we look at the very product 
of imagination, namely "the forming of images." We notice that imagination 
works not only in literary creativity, but also in the forming of images in our mind, 
and what's more, in our very act of perception, of seeing an object. It is 
Wamock's idea that certain features of imagination appear as "essential and 
universal,"3 and James Liu says we have to be aware of the similarities, and even 
more of the differences，{The Art xiii) when doing comparative studies. What I 
have in mind here is the forming of images in poetics in China and the West, and 
though the two meet in using imagination to form images, they differ in their ways 
of "handling" them: to put it in a very simple way, artists and philosophers in the 
West tend to look at objects from a single viewpoint, and strive to complete them 
with their imagination. The Classical Chinese poets, however, prefer to look at 
objects from multiple viewpoints, and imagination leads the subject to roam 
around the object, or with the object in time and space, in the hope of seeing 
more of that particular object in sight in the world. 
The above findings brings us back to the different philosophical tradition in 
China and the West, which have moulded their attitude toward the self and the 
external nature. Generally speaking, the tradition of thinking in the West is an 
epistemological one (or more correctly, a Faustian one), which aims at absolute 
understanding and knowing of things by the individual self. In order to achieve 
absolute comprehension, philosophers and artists have to fill in the gap that is 
^See Chapter three of this thesis. 
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missing: the gap between an aspect of the object seen and the whole object. The 
Chinese tradition, however, has much to do with the Daoist teaching. The finite 
human beings are a part of the infinite nature (The Dao), we are not entitled to 
absolute comprehension, since we are just passing figures in this infinite nature. 
But to take one step back, we can seek proximal comprehension by exhausting 
our perception. The subject is (unlike that in the West) definitely not the creator 
and all-powerful manipulator controlling nature but just a part of nature 
manifesting the cosmic Dao. I shall begin my concluding discussion with the last 
part of Chapter Three: the definite perspective in the Western Renaissance and 
Romantics aesthetics versus the mobile perspectives in Classical Chinese poetry. 
PERSPECTIVES AND SELF 
I have said that one "proper way" of looking at things in the West (ever since 
the Renaissance) is the more scientific single viewpoint. The single-viewpoint 
technique is an indication of the existence of a sense of individuation, through the 
working of the imagination. Merleau-Ponty, in an essay entitled "The Child's 
Relations with Others," points out that a child does not have a sense of 
individuation, and is shown in his inability to understand perspectives in drawing: 
"the idea that he sees [things] from a single point of view instead of living in 
them" (Merleau-Ponty 127). To gain this sense of perspective, one has to 
maintain a certain distance from the object or the world perceived, the Other. 
This single viewpoint is one's own consciousness of "a particular view of the world 
as 'mine'" (Rzepka 18). This "view of the world as mine," together with a distance 
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from the object perceived, allow the subjective imagination to work on the object, 
and complete the image in the mind's eyes, like the way one complete the picture 
of the "duck-rabbit."^ By completing the picture I mean adding values and 
meanings to the object by our imagination. Such a process is particularly obvious 
in the Romantic Age, with its emphasis on imagination. Robert Langbaum says, 
The process of experience is for the romanticist a process of self-
realization, of a constantly expanding discovery of the self through 
the discovery of its imprint on the external world . • • • Since the 
romanticist finds in the object [of experience] the values he puts 
there, he finds also the objectification of at least one aspect of the 
values compatible with his own fullest existence • • . values he has 
known potentially all alone within himself. (25-26) 
Through the operation of his imagination, the Romantics put into the object 
perceived, some subjective values to create the object, and to objectify the 
subjective values is actually an act of aggrendization of the self. The Romantics 
have experienced a world that the Romantic self has made meaningful and 
coherent by its imagination. So imagination is in a manipulating position, 
exercising a dominating control over the situation in which the object is perceived. 
In his Tintem Abbey," for instance, Wordsworth presents us scenes with 
single points of view, in which the objects occupy fixed locations: 
4 Wittgenstein's illustration of，the thing as it is perceived,，quoted by Mary Wamock 
in her discussion on perception and the forming of mental images. Also quoted in 
Chapter 3. 
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Five years have past; five summers, with the length 
Of five long winters! and again I hear 
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs 
With a soft inland murmur,-Once again 
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs. 
That on a wild secluded scene impress 
Thoughts of a more deep seclusion; and connect 
The landscape with the quiet of the sky. 
The day is come when I again repose 
Here，under this dark sycamore, and view 
These plots of cottage-ground, these orchard-tufts, 
Which at this season, with their unripe fruits, 
Are clad in one green hue, and lose themselves 
，Mid groves and copses. Once again I see 
These hedge-rows, hardly hedge-rows, little lines 
Of sportive wood urn wild: these pastoral farms, 
Green to the very door; and wreaths of smoke 
Sent up, in silence, from among the trees! 
With some uncertain notice, as might seem 
Of vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods, 
Or of some Hermit's cave, where by his fire 
The Hermit sits alone. (1-22, italic mine) 
Here in this part of the poem Worsworth presents absent objects as though they 
» 
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were right before him. These objects are out of his sight but not his mind. 
However, as he says he hears and sees these things before him, he is not simply 
retrieving his memory, but exercising his imagination to turn them into newness. 
What he "sees," or rather "insists" he sees, are controlled by his imagination. The 
"sycamore," the "cottage-ground," and also the "orchard-tufts," are in a fixed spatial 
relation, situated in a particular time(the season when the fruits are still "unripe") 
that becomes "now." Wordsworth's imagination beholds the mental images, by so 
doing he believes he sees "into the life of things." To behold the mental images 
is to Wordsworth the beholding of "respired with inward meaning" (1805 III 129). 
This "seeing into the life of things" is actually the seeing into the subject's own 
life, and particularly, the poet's imagination in things, since it is this imaginative 
seeing which gives the things their life. 
For image-forming in Chinese paintings and poetry, imagination operates in 
a basically similar but finally different way. Like image-forming in the West, the 
Chinese imagine in the very act of seeing. The two differ however in their 
treatment of the image-formation: the Westerners choose to complete the image 
by their own imagination from a static viewpoint, while the Classical Chinese 
poets prefer to present one image after another, this mobile viewpoint leads us 
to see more angles/dimensions of the object perceived. I have quoted Wai-lim 
Yip's translation of "Mount Chungnan" [Zhongnan] in the previous chapter. The 
readers may recall that the perceptions of the mountain are from various 
perspectives: there is a unique perspective in every line of the poem. Yip claims 
that we look at the mountain in the same way we look at a sculpture, and we see 
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it as a totality. I suppose Yip is far too optimistic at this point. For every 
perspective we are seeing one aspect of the mountain, and even a very tiny shift 
in our angle of seeing can bring us to a new vista completely different from the 
previous one we have. So in that sense we can never see the whole of the object. 
Imagination in the Classical Chinese context is not a means to complete for us the 
object we perceived aspectually, but rather, to lead us to a new dimension each 
time in the optimistic hope of exhausting our perception by seeing more of the 
object, and more. Such difference in the role of imagination has much to do with 
the two domains，philosophical and cosmic outlook, which we are going to look 
into. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND COSMIC OUTLOOK CHINA AND THE WEST 
The Western tradition of thinking is an epistemological one. L: all begins with 
the Sophists，question of whether what we think we know about nature is really 
an objective part of it, and how much is contributed by the human mind (Edwards 
8). This skepticism marks the beginning of epistemology. Epistemology is the 
attempt to justify the claim that knowledge is possible, and to assess that part 
played by the senses and reason in the acquisition of knowledge. Plato is the real 
originator of epistemology. He first starts out to deal with some basis questions 
about knowledge, and to him "man is the measure of all things" (Edwards 9). 
5 Plato's basic questions about knowledge includes: 1. What is knowledge? 2. Where 
is knowledge generally found? 3. How much we ordinarily think we know is really 
knowledge? 4. Do the senses provide knowledge? 5. Can reason supply knowledge? 6. 
what is the relation between taowledge and true belief. 
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Such mentality has developed into a Faustian Outlook when there is a desire for 
absolute knowledge. In fact, the act of striving for absolute knowledge is really 
a very "man-all-powerful" process no matter one strives to know by experience or 
reason. The quest for truth implies a basic assumption that "things can be 
brought into a common measure So to look for reconciliation of different 
viewpoints is a sort of bad faith" (Morse 258). Thus, aesthetics in the West (at 
least up to the Romantics) is basically monoscopic, with everything in 
perspective,^ and the conception of the world [is] filtered through the stabilising 
influence of perspective" (Morse 259). Imagination operates in such a tradition 
of thinking, and it has the mission to aggrendize the Self by completing the 
object-in-perspective. 
All the while I have been dealing with natural images. Now after some 
discussion on the Western epistemological tradition, I would like to go back a 
little to the landscape, or more precisely, nature itself. I want to do this because 
epistemology has begun with the quest for knowledge of nature; besides, nature 
is also the ground for Romantic imagination to take off. For a very long time, the 
Westerners have sought for truth in the domain of Platonic ideal and the 
Almighty Christian God. Nature, in comparison, is nothing but a creation of God, 
and before the Romantic Age, it is still "morally contemptible, and "a merely 
machine" (Chaves 125). Then there comes a time when the Romantics suddenly 
6 What I call "in perspective" is actually in single-viewpoint. Ever since the 
Renaissance, perspective has valorised seeing for one particular position, with a single 
vanishing point. This method of seeing is not merely adopted for representing truth, but 
also implying balance and proportion. 
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discover that nature is a new world waiting to be explored. The Romantic artists, 
in particular, are irritated to find that they are moved by the vastness and 
sublimity of the external nature, and through their imagination, they seek "to 
arrive at a sense of comprehension of the vast and extended landscape" (Wong 
100). In order to gain absolute comprehension of the world, imagination has the 
mission to complete the natural objects perceived, and the very act of completing 
the images is actually an act of creation. So what we have here is the Romantic 
artists becoming the God of this newly created realm and result in a God-like 
individual, who has the ability to control the situation-"the situation in which his 
identity is to be realised and defined" (Rzepka 27). To control the situation one 
has to achieve absolute comprehension, and the artist is actually embracing all 
worldly things in his vision. Wordsworth, for example, finds in the object the 
values he puts there. At Cambridge he writes, 
To every natural form, rock, fruit or flower, 
Even the loose stones that cover the highway, 
• • • 
I saw them feel. 
Or linked them to some feeling. The great mass 
Lay bedded in a quickening soul, and all 
That I beheld respired with inward meaning (1805 HI: 124-129) 
The moment when, as Wordsworth says, "we see into the life of things," we are 
seeing our own life and our very soul in things. Upon this imposition of values in 
things, Hume certainly has something to say, 
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For my part, when I enter most intimately into where I call myself, 
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain and pleasure. I never can 
catch mvself at anv time without a perception, and never can 
observe anything but the perception. {Philosophical 534)7 
To see life in things, we are seeing our very own self, since it is our imagination 
that creates the object perceived and grants them life. Hume says that he cannot 
catch himself without a perception, and he is right there. The Romantic poet, for 
example Wordsworth, embraces the world with his vision, and he is in an 
authorised position to "hear," "behold" and "see."^ He needs to become 
something definite in the natural world occupying a certain space. This definite 
existence of the self in the natural world implies a single point of view, a 
perspective. In fact, the Romantic poets prefer to create and complete the 
natural world on their own terms by their own imagination, rather than "as an 
unanchored perception or series of perceptions of the world" (Rzepka 25). This 
is the only possible way to gain absolute comprehension of the world when all is 
under the control of the subjective imagination. Imagination thus becomes a 
means for the aggrendization of the self, rather than a way to know nature. 
From Romantic epsitemology we proceed to the Chinese cosmic outlook. I 
have said in Chapter Two that Liu Xie has adopted a Daoist approach in 
1 Underline mine. 
8 See line 1-22 of "Titem Abbey" quoted earlier in this chapter. 
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elaborating shen-si. In fact, what we have been concerned here is mainly Daoist 
aesthetics, which "is largely responsible for Chinese theories of art in general and 
landscape poetry in particular" (Wong 104). I would therefore like to account 
for how the Daoist concepts of nature, time and man affect the Chinese 
imaginative perception in art-that of multi-perspectivity. 
DAO AND THE HUMAN MIND 
The Chinese concept that every object possesses its own shen comes from the 
Daoist concept that every object embodies the Dao, Zhuangzi's famous passage 
describes the Dao in the following way: 
Master Tung-kuo [Dong-Guo] asked Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi], 
"This thing called the Way [Dao] - where does it exist?" 
Chuang Tzu said, "There's no place it doesn't exist." 
"Come," said Master Tung-kuo, "You must be most specific•” 
"It is in an ant." 
"As low a thing as that?" 
"It is in the panic grass." 
"But that's lower still!" 
"It is in the tiles and shards." 
"How can it be so low?" 
"It is in the piss and dung." (Watson, Complete Work 45) 
Zhuangzi's dialoque with Master Dong-guo sounds dramatic, but it serves as 
a very good illustration of the fact that Dao is in everything everywhere. Nature, 
99 
which comprises all worldly objects, is actually the manifestation of this cosmic 
Dao, Like other natural objects in nature, man is originated in Dao as well (Xu 
50). So in that sense we are a part of this nature, and one form of manifestation 
of the cosmic Dao, 
Zhuangzi divides human mental faculty into two levels: the ordinary mind 
卷 ts (Shang'Xin), and the superior mind with imaginative perception (Tsai 228). 
The Ordinary mind is the fixed and limited mind which is outward and one way 
(Tsai 228). What we are concerned with is rather the Superior mind, which 
possesses shen as manifestation of Dao in man. This shen is the mental agent of 
Dao, and it has the ability to move back and forth between the self and the 
external world, or various objects in nature and Dao. Such ability to move 
around, or rather, the concept of travel, is quite significant to the Daoist thinking. 
The highest form of travel to Zhuangzi is his "Untroubled Voyage of 
Enjoyment" ^ (Xiao-yao you) which marks the liberation of the spirit, 
inviting imagination to freedom: 
实 1 jL , 甚或 ' A ^ 银•錄 i / � 7 r ^ $ … 
a l i a -
货 冬 知 f … • 怒 、 b 飞 • 实 $ 
In the northern darkness there is a fish and his name is Kun, The 
Kun is so huge I don't know how many thousand li he measure. He 
changes and becomes a bird whose name is Peng. The back of the 
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Peng measures I don't know how many thousand li across and, 
when he rises up and flies off, his wings are like clouds all over the 
sky. When the sea begins to move, this bird sets off for the 
southern darkness, which is the Lake of Heaven. (Translation by 
Watson) 
According to Tsai, the gigantic bird "is an emblem of the upsurging 
imagination" (Tsai 230). But what is the use of this freedom of imagination and 
mobility? This bird is very likely a symbol "for the Perfect Man who, when 
transcending the pettiness and triviality of human existence freely wanders in the 
void of infinite and nothingness" (Tsai 231). This free power can be seen almost 
everywhere in Chinese paintings and poetry, in which there is always "an 
unanchored perception or series of perceptions of the world" (Rzepka 25). 
The Chinese painters and poets do not only move around an object as in 
"Mount Chungnan: he juxtaposes objects from various time-space and scenes of 
different distance in the same painting or poem. No doubt these arts demonstrate 
the Chinese concept of the subject and object going on an excursion. But it is 
only a superficial phenomenon. Izutsu has his point by saying that the bird 
symbolises the force to transcend our own pettiness and triviality in-order to 
wander freely in the infinite, but to wander freely is definitely not the end of the 
story. I would like to single out Izutsu's "human triviality" and "the indefinite," 
and move on to the last part of the Chinese way of comprehending nature. I shall 
begin with the Daoist concept of nature. 
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DAO AND THE CHINESE WAY OF COMPREHENDING NATURE 
I have pointed out that the Westerners, with their epistemological tradition, 
demands absolute comprehension of nature. Imagination in the West thus 
becomes a means to know and to glorify the self in the domain of natural scenery. 
Then there comes a time when facing the vastness of natural scenery in nature, 
the imagination fails to comprehend the sublime nature right before the eyes of 
the self. The individual finds his own inability and inadequacy to obtain full 
comprehension of the infinite nature. So in addition to the tense confrontation 
between subject and object there is, in Kant's words, a sense of horror rising out 
of the confrontation between self and nature, since the Romantics realise that the 
vastness and infiniteness of nature is far from their ability to perceive, to imagine 
so as to fully comprehend. 
The Chinese may find such mentality of the West absurd, if not difficult to 
understand. This is because the Chinese have never wanted to gain absolute 
comprehension of nature. Wong Kin-yuen points out that while the Western poet 
tries to arrive at a sense of comprehension of the vastness of nature, "the Chinese 
poet simply records the beauty of whatever his sense perception can reach" 
('Temporalization" 100). Such attitude of dealing with natural sublime has its 
reasons behind. 
I have mentioned earlier that nature is the manifestation of the cosmic Dao, 
and Dao encompasses everything in the world, including human beings. So in that 
sense we are part of nature. As we are a part of nature, we are in no position, 
in Yip's terms," to generalize, formulate, classify and order" the phenomenal world 
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which will necessarily result in some form of restriction, reduction or even 
distortion" ("The Taoist" 21), since we are nothing more superior. Free from 
human manipulation, the essence of Dao is therefore one which is so-of-itself 
nature is to practice X//z-za/专(fasting of mind) by emptying the mind, so as 
to be "ready to receive all things that come over. It is this particular philosophy, 
as suggested by Wong, "which has taught the Chinese poet to accept nature as it 
is, to naturalise himself in it and then to gain an artistic gratification through the 
re-creation of its grandeur in verse" ("Negative-positive" 135); it is also this 
philosophical outlook that explains why there is no tense confrontation between 
self and nature as in the Romantic poetry, or in Kant's natural sublime. Wong, 
when explaining why there is no conflict between perceptual apprehension and 
comprehension in the Chinese poets, attributes this phenomenon to the Chinese's 
simple belief of "what is out there is precisely what the eyes can see; and one only 
"strains the eyes to exhaust the plain" ("Negative-positive" 133). it is because, 
according to the Daoist teaching, "what the eye sees is where the Tao [Dao] 
resides" ("Negative-positive" 137). 
DAOIST CONCEPT OF TIME AND POETIC PERCEPTIONS 
However, there still leaves something unresolved. The reader may recall 
Izutsu's idea of transcending the pettiness and triviality of human existence to 
wander freely in the infinite and nothingness. Human beings, like objects in the 
phyiscal nature, also embody Dao in their existence, but once when the object 
dissolved or disintegrated, the Dao in it also disappear. The same can happen to 
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the individual as well. Such frustrating situation is due to the finiteness of human 
existence in contrast with the infiniteness of the Dao. So human being can never 
equal Dao which "is inaudible, invisible, inexpressible, indescribable and 
inexhaustible" (Tsai 227). Nature, as the embodiment oi Dao, is everlasting, and 
when the finite individual encounters the infinite nature, imbalance occurs. The 
Chinese have taken for granted that man is finite and incomplete, and Dao is, like 
time, "a continuity without beginning or end" (Wong 104)，so absolute 
comprehension of nature is never possible. The Chinese accept this as a fact, that 
they "know less than they do not know" (Wong 105). Thus what the Chinese look 
for is not absolute knowing, but proximal comprehension of nature (Wong 107). 
In order to get the most of it out of a finite time, imagination shoulders the 
mission of leading the subject to move around objects and natural scenery, 
recording every beautiful perception that comes into vision. The more 
perspectives the Chinese poets have, the better they claim to know about nature, 
and the closer they are to full perception. To exhaust their perception, the 
Chinese allow their imagination to lead them roam around an object, in and out 
of a landscape, or even as far as to juxtapose in their art images of various 
seasons, time and space. The feeling of travelling is best illustrated by looking at 
some horizontal scroll of Chinese painting, in which we travel while we see and 
we see while we travel In order to see more, we have to move along, and to 
move along enables us to see more. We are led by our imagination to move in 
and out, seeing one image after the other, thus maximizing our visibility. This 
maximization of perspectives by imagination is best illustrated by Wong's 
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discussion of the poem by Wang Zhi-huang ^ £ . I quote here the two 
lines relevant to my discussions: 
场、% -T T ^ 
IT K -序樓 
To widen (exhaust) the ken of a thousand miles, 
Up, up another flight of stairs. 
By another flight of stairs up, imagination is leading our perception to a wider 
horizon. Imagination does not let us see the whole of the object or the scene 
perceived by completing the perception for us (since it is too unrealistic), it only 
moves us along to see more of the object or the scene which is infinite. It is this 
idea of knowing more that keep us going. 
Barricelli, when comparing the Italian poet Leopardi and the Chinese poet 
lA Bai, has quoted Li's poem "Question and Answer in the Mountain" iU 才冬 
for illustration: 
I W ] 余圣樣焚 ^ 
IJ ^ ^ 4 义召 
You asked me why I nestle among the green mountain, 
I smile without answering, my mind, all by itself, at ease. 
Peach blossoms on flowing water are going far away; 
There is another cosmo, not the human world. 
(translation by James Liu) 
‘ • , • 
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The "peach blossom on flowing water moving away" reminds us of our 
impossibility of sight because of our finiteness, and this very impossibility of 
seeing invites our "imagination to freedom" (Barrcelli 2). But Barrcelli knows not 
enough to conclude that "what the physical eye cannot reach due to the 
limitations of finite . . . the mental eye completes imaginatively" (Barrcelli 2). 
This is a very Western kind of mentality. Imagination in the Chinese poetry or 
painting does not look toward the completion of images or perception of the 
external objects and scenes, but rather, the desire to roam freely with the humble 
wish of seeing as much as the infinite human vision can. 
Upon this Michael Sullivan definitely has something to say, 
The very concept of completion is utterly alien to the Chinese way 
of thinking. The Chinese painter [or poet] deliberately avoids a 
complete statement because he knows that we can never know 
everything, that what we can describe, or "complete," cannot be 
true, except in a very limited sense. All he can do is to liberate 
the imagination and set it wandering over the limitless spaces of the 
universe. His landscape is not a final statement, but a starting 
point; not an end, but the opening of a door. (157” 
Imagination in Chinese poetry and paintings does not look toward the completion 
9 Originally Sullivan is talking about the device of leaving empty space in Chinese 
painting. There are critics who believe that such device is for allowing the viewer to 
complete the painting in their imagination. Sullivan disagrees and the quotation I used 
is his response to those critics' belief. I have added in bracketed words wher necessary, 
so as to make this quotation relevant to my discussion. Underline mine. 
* 
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of images of the external objects and scenes perceived, but rather, the desire to 
roam freely with the humble wish of seeing as much as the finite human vision 
can reach. I shall end my concluding chapter with a study of the poem I have 
promised earlier to discuss—the poem "Writing on the Wall at West Forest 
Temple"趣 林受，by Su Dong-po: 
樣看爲省侧成年 
乂 I ； � > V 山、’ 
From across it becomes a mountain range; from the side a single 
peak. 
Far, near, high, low, all look different. 
Not knowing the true-face of Mount Lu, 
Because I am in this mountain, (translation mine) 
The first line of this poem is typically a Chinese treatment of perspectives. There 
are two perspectives juxtaposed in a single line. The poet tries to maximize the 
many perspectives we can see in limited time and space. So within a very short 
moment the poet has led the readers see Mount Lu from across and sideway. He 
soon discovers that looking from different angles can generate different images 
of the same Mount Lu, It reminds me of Guo Xi's ^^nstruction on drawing 
mountains: 
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/a 5 ^ h � > ^； I 希 善 異 ； n ^ - j 5 5 
丄 � v 
A mountain looks this way close by, another way a few miles away, 
and yet another way from a distance of a dozen miles. Its shape 
changes at every step, the more, the farther one goes. It looks this 
way from the front, another way from the side, and yet another way 
from the back. Its aspect changes from every angle, as many times 
as the point of view. Thus one must realize that a mountain 
contains in itself the shape of several dozen or a hundred 
mountains. (Wong, "Negative-positive 143) 
Su Dong-po in his visit to Mount Lu, shares the same experience with Guo Xi. 
The poet realises that he can never achieve full perception of the mountain in 
sight, no matter how he moves around, he can only see their aspects, and these 
aspects change with his points of view. He sees only parts rather than the whole. 
So in his third line, he comes to the possible disquietude of not being able to see 
the "true-face" of Mount Lu. However, the sense of anxiety and horror in Kant 
and Wordsworth never disturbs Su Dong-po. The Romantic poet, for example 
Wordsworth, embraces nature with his vision, because he is in Mount Lu. How 
is their existence in the natural world different? 
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I have said earlier in this chapter that in order to be in an authorised 
position to "hear," "behold" and "see," the Romantic poet needs to become 
something definite in the natural world occupying a certain space. This definite 
existence of the self in the natural world implies a single point of view, a 
perspective. Su，s "in the mountain" is not quite the same: he does not occupy a 
definite space in the mountain as Wordsworth does, for he does not look toward 
embracing fully the world in vision, Su's unanchored perceptions give him more 
ease than anxiety and he accepts his existence in the mountain as the reason for 
his inability to recognise the "true-face" of Mount Lu. In fact, he is the same at 
ease as Li Bai who watches the flowing water moving away. Both poets have 
their means to "immerse themselves in the universe" (Wong, "Negative-positive" 
134)—Li Bai strains his perceptions by feeding his eyes on the endlessly flowing 
water; whilst Su Dong-po stays in Mount Lu, travelling around in the hope of 
exhausting his perception with the inexhaustable vistas of the object perceived. 
Up to now it is quite clear that Chinese imagination, like that in the West, 
serves to equate the act of seeing with what is being seen; to join perception with 
the object perceived. Imagination in Classical Chinese poetry, however, guides 
the readers gently and steadily to exhaust their perception of the natural world. 
Poets in the West, especially the Romantic poets, have the will to conquer the 
world and otherness, so as to embrace the whole of them, while the Chinese poets 
decide to gently grasp as much of the otherness as they can by their imaginative 
perception. Another step up, or another look at the object would mean a step 
closer to the infinite, through the power of imagination. 
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